Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A Case Study of Section 201 and its Interpretation by the International Trade Commission by Adams, Walter & Dirlam, Joel B.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 52 | Issue 3 Article 2
Spring 1977
Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A
Case Study of Section 201 and its Interpretation by
the International Trade Commission
Walter Adams
Michigan State University
Joel B. Dirlam
University of Rhode Island
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the
International Trade Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adams, Walter and Dirlam, Joel B. (1977) "Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A Case Study of Section 201 and its
Interpretation by the International Trade Commission," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 52 : Iss. 3 , Article 2.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol52/iss3/2
Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974:
A Case Study of Section 201 and its Interpretation
by the International Trade Commission
WALTER ADAMS* & JOEL B. DIRLAM**
INTRODUCTION
Business firms in both concentrated and unconcentrated industries are
engaged in a perpetual struggle to validate their market territory, to repel
invaders, to maintain their franchise to customers-in short, to protect
themselves from the erosive effects of competition. Their strategy may
include private action such as collusion, merger, price discrimination or a
variety of exclusive agreements to fence in their actual or potential rivals;
but market-place tactics, even by powerful firms with genuine economies of
scale, are not always adequate to obtain the desired results and often
conflict with antitrust prohibitions. When this is the case powerful
interests can petition the government to erect artifical barriers to entry, in
order to achieve by public action that which the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent. A prime example is the cumbersome control
machinery, administered by independent regulatory commissions in ever
wider areas of interstate commerce, which has repeatedly been shown to
raise costs, inhibit innovation and preserve incumbents-in short, to
protect insiders from competition rather than the public from exploit-
ation.' Another, equally egregious example is the artificial restraint on
international trade, whether by tariffs, quotas or similiar arrangements,
which have the effect of curtailing or eliminating foreign competition in
the American market.
These public restraints on competition have recently assumed par-
ticular significance for two reasons: First, the political pressures on
government to attenuate competition are no longer confined to business
interests, but are now supported even by the more progressive public-
spirited trade unions. 2 Forces which were once thought to be counter-
*B.A. 1942, Brooklyn College; M.A. 1946, Yale Univ.; Ph.D. 1947, Yale Univ.
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Theodore Gates and Edward Martin have made valuable criticisms of an earlier draft of
this article. They have no responsibility for remaining errors or for the authors' conclusions.
1W. ADAMS & H. GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERICA ch. III (1955); Adams, The Role of
Competition in the Regulated Industries, 58 Am. EcoN. REV. 527, 527-43 (1958); Adams, The
Regulatory Commissions and Small Business, 24 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 147 (1959).
.
2 Organized labor supported the Burke-Hartke bill that provided for mandatory quotas.
Tariff and Trade Proposals: Hearings before House Ways & Means Comm., 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1001-15 (1970) (statement of A.J. Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-
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vailing are now coalescing; auto workers, steel workers and communi-
cations workers now march shoulder to shoulder with their bosses against a
common enemy-competition in their industries. Second, artificial gov-
ernment restraints compound the difficulty of dealing with the most
intransigent and intractable economic problem of our time, not only in the
United States but the entire industrialized non-Communist world-inflation-
in-the-midst-of-recession. 3 Macro-economic measures alone are pitifully
deficient in coping with recessions, except at an exorbitant and politically
intolerable price in the form of inflation.' Such anti-recession measures
must, therefore, be supplemented with an "incomes policy" in an effort to
contain inflationary pressures. Short of mandatory wage and price
controls, competition must play a central role in any anti-inflation
program, whether or not it involves "voluntary" controls or wage-price
guidelines. This means that in the short run, and absent any long run
efforts at comprehensive restructuring of the oligopoly segment of the
economy, the government must promote the most free international trade
possible. 5 It must recognize, as Gottfried Haberler once said, that "free
international trade is perhaps the most effective antitrust policy."'6
The Trade Act of 19747 and its interpretation by the International
Trade Commission can directly affect the viability and vitality of import
competition. Subsequent analysis will be confined primarily to the
"escape clause" 8 provision of the Act, because this provision appears to
CIO); id. at 1015 (AFL-CIO Policy Resolution adopted Oct. 1969); see Trade Reform:
Hearings on H.R. 6767, Trade Reform Act of 1973 before House Ways & Means Comm., 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1223-24 (1973) (statement of I.W. Abel: "The AFL-CIO supports the Burke-
Hartke Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1973 .... The bill provides that all products that
come into the U.S. would be awarded an annual import quota of the number of units that
.entered the United States during the 1965-1969 period."); id. at 3863 (statement of L. Teper,
Director of Research, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, to same effect); id. at
3874 (statement of H. Samuel, President, Amalgamated Clothing Workers). See also '1973
CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC 836 (statement of George Meany); and letter from Leonard
Woodcock, President of UAW, to Assistant Secretary of Treasury, David R. McDonald, July
11, 1975, supporting auto industry dumping complaint against German, British and Italian
auto makers.3
"[T]he inability to control both inflation and unemployment within acceptable
institutions is the major flaw of Western economies today." Nordhaus, Inflation Theory and
Policy, 66 AM. EcoN. REv. 59, 64 (May 1976).
'Blair, Inflation in the United States in THE RooTs OF INFLATION 65 (1975); Kahn,
Market Power Inflation in THE ROOTS OF INFLATION 239-72 (1975); Means, Simultaneous
Inflation and Unemployment in THE ROOTS OF INFLATION 27-30 (1975); Okun, Inflation in
2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIc AcrlvrTY 382-90 (A. Okun & G. Perry eds. 1975). The British,
French, German, European Community and East European inflations are analyzed by J.
Dirlam, P.S. Florence, H. Arndt, H. de Jong & N. Dodge in chapters III, IV, V, VI & VII of THE
ROOTS OF INFLATION, supra.5Consistent with the standards of fair competition.6See Krause, Import Discipline, 11 J. INDUS. EcoN. 34 (1962).
719 U.S.C. § 2101 (Supp. V 1975).
8Article XIX of the G.A.T.T. (General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade) "Emergency
Action on Imports of Particular Products," permits a contracting party to suspend tariff
concessions when "unforeseen developments ... cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
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have far reaching potential for limiting imports, and because it is the most
susceptible of misuse in stifling fair competition. A series of tables
graphically summarizing the major cases discussed is provided at the
conclusion of the article.
In 1973 the Nixon Administration introduced a bill providing for
comprehensive changes in existing foreign trade statutes in an effort to
forestall mandatory quotas on imports.9 The Administration bill was also
designed to convey the necessary power to the President to enable him to
enter into a new round of trade agreement negotiations that would include
nontariff barriers; it expanded and strengthened countermeasures against
dumping and other forms of unfair international competition from
subsidies to exports; and it charged the President with responsibility for
taking extraordinary measures when the United States balance of payments
stability seemed to be seriously threatened. 10
As it finally passed Congress, after being held up for months on various
peripheral issues," the Trade Act of 1974 had unusual potential for both
good and ill.12 Most important, the "escape clause" section of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962,13 under which American industries, individual
producers .... 61 Stat. Pt. 5, at A 58-59 (1947). Note that 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (Supp. V
1975) provide for relief from injury caused by imports. This type of legislation, even though it
may not specifically refer to Article XIX, is customarily termed "escape clause." See K. DAM,
THE GAIT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 99 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
K. DAM].
9Introduced in every Congress from 1966, the most recent and potent embodiment had
been the Burke-Hartke bill, H.R. 16920, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). It was reintroduced as
H.R. 62, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The substitute legislation, which evolved into the Trade
Act of 1974, relieved the President of the risk that he might be obliged to veto a measure that
drew strong support on the grounds that its protected American jobs from vicious foreign
competition. In order to be attractive to Congress the administration bill had to make
concessions to protectionists.
IDSee 1973 CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC 42-A. Presidential message transmitting the bill
to Congress, April 10, 1973. The scope of the Trade Act of 1974 is reviewed in Leonard &
Foster, The Metamorphosis of the U.S. International Trade Commission under the Trade Act
of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 719-77 (1976).
"The Administration bill had been sent to Congress April 10, 1973. It was not reported
out by the House Ways and Means Committee until October 10, 1973. On December 11, 1973
it passed the House. It was referred to the Senate Finance Committee on December 12, 1973.
The bill languished there for months because of the issue of Jewish emigration which was
linked to trade concessions to the Soviet Union. See [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
7335-38 (exchange of letters between Senator Jackson and Secretary of State Kissinger, Oct. 18,
1974). The Senate version of the bill was adopted on December 13, 1974. On December 20,
1974, the House and Senate agreed to the conference report on the bill. [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7186.12Negotiating procedures and objectives are prescribed for reductions in tariff and
nontariff barriers, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2137 (Supp. V 1975). By introducing product sector
objectives for manufacturing, 19 U.S.C. § 2114 (Supp. V 1975), and providing for the
establishment of advisory committees from particular industries, 19 U.S.C. § 2155(c)(2) (Supp. V
1975), the Act appears to introduce the possibility of negotiating on an industry-by-industry
basis,with decisions based on separately calculated industry or even product trade balance.
The Act also strengthens the procedures for countering of discriminatory favoritism by foreign
governments to exports. 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (Supp. V 1975); 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. V 1975).
319 U.S.C. § 1901 (1970).
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firms and workers had been dismally unsuccessful in obtaining relief, 4
was rewritten to lower the standards for import responsibility for injury.'5
In addition, adjustment assistance for workers could be provided by the
Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Commerce could make loans to
injured businesses without Tariff Commission 6 review." Also, the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921 was amended to permit the introduction of cost data
when home market prices are not representative.' 8 Finally, the provisions
of the law relating to unfair trade practices by importers were expanded.' 9
4
CoMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, REPORT 49-50 (1971);
Metzger, Adjustment Assistance, in id. at 319-42 [hereinafter cited as Adjustment Assistance];
Fulda, Adjustment to Hardship Caused by Imports: The New Decisions of the Tariff
Commission and the Need for Legislative Clarification, 70 MICH. L. REV. 791 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Hardship].
1519 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
16Now the International Trade Commission.
1719 U.S.C. § 2231 (Supp. V 1975).
1'lhere were other changes in the Anti-dumping Act which deserve at least passing
mention. 28 U.S.C. § 2631(b) (1970) (as amended), provides, for example, that if the Secretary
of Treasury concludes there may be substantial doubt as to whether there is import injury, the
case is forwarded to the International Trade Commission for an indication, within thirty days,
as to whether there is a reasonable indication of possible injury. (A wise and seasoned
bureaucrat would, of course, generally return the case to the Secretary with the opinion that
there is no reasonable indication that an industry is not being injured). Also of significance is
the fact that within thirty days of a negative dumping finding by the Secretary, the American
manufacturer, producer or wholesaler of the goods in question may appeal the decision to the
Customs Court. Id.
19Ahhough 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) in its original form was far from clear, because it did
not indicate whether the unfair methods of competition at issue were those employed in the
United States or had their origin in the exporting country, the amendment adds to the
confusion. The Commission is directed to exclude offending articles, but this decision can be
nullified "after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare [and]
competitive conditions in the United States .... " 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (Supp. V 1975). Both the
television industry and manufacturers of welded stainless steel pipe have seized on this section
to try to exclude Japanese imports, alleging subsidization and conspiracy to undersell. See
Petition before.the ITC, Welded Stainless Steel Pipe (Oct. 26, 1976); Investigation No. 337-TA-
23, Certain Television Receiving Sets (March 1976).
The television investigation was suspended pending the Commission's resolution of an
import injury case under section 201. See TELEVISION RECEIVERS, U.S.I.T.C. Pun. No. 808
(March 1977)[hereinafter cited as TELEVISION RECEIVERS]. Likewise suspended was a
preliminary investigation of unfair methods of competition in the importation of television
sets. The White House and the State, Treasury and Justice Departments all opposed the TV
manufacturers' petition as did the FTC, arguing that if there was dumping, the complaint
should have filed under the Anti-dumping Act. The Commission had found injury to
U.S. industry from dumping by Japanese television manufacturers. T.C. PuB. No. 367 ( 1971).
Since 1973, imports subject to the dumping finding have not been appraised, and no dumping
duties have been levied. See TELEVISION RECEIVERS, supra, at 3 n.1. On January 17, 1977,
Senator Edwald Kennedy sent to Assistant Attorney General Donald Baker a letterenclosingpor-
tions ofa 1970 written agreement among Japanese television manufacturers providing for fines if
export sales were made at less than specified prices. Senator Kennedy asked, among other
questions, why the Antitrust Division had opposed the ITC's efforts to investigate "prima
facie evidence of per se and other violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section
337 of the Tariff Act."
Mr. Baker replied, on February 16, that the issues raised by the 337 petition had already
been tonsidered in a Treasury dumping proceeding or were cognizable in a countervailing
duty proceeding. "An ITC 337 proceeding would be largely duplicative . . . and might
anlonnt to anti-competitive harassment of Japanese firms." There was no evidence of an
[Vol. 52:535
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ELIGIBILITY FOR RELIEF. FROM IMPORT COMPETITION
This article examines International Trade Commission (ITC) reports
on -import injury issued in response both to petitions by unions and
by business firms and to requests for investigations, Congressional or
Presidential, and the ultimate disposal of ITC recommendations by the
President. The review will appraise the statutory definition of industry and
the economic tests of injury and their application by the Commission, and
will evaluate the recommendations for relief, if any, proposed by the Com-
mission and adopted by the President.
Under the 1974 Trade Act, the Commission must make three sequential
economic decisions before reaching a recommendation.20 As a prerequisite
to any inquiry into industry injury, the Commission must find that imports
ot this industry's products have increased.2 1 Such a determination may not
appear at first blush to pose an economic problem, but the time period
within which the existence of an increase is to be measured must be selected
by the Commission.2 2 Economic considerations may lead to the rejection of
a period within which imports have increased and the substitution of
another where they have remained stable. The ITC must then determine
whether the American industry in question has been seriously injured.23
And, finally, it must assess the responsibility of imports in causing the
injury.2 4 As an alternative the Commission may conclude that although
the increased imports have not injured a domestic industry, they constitute
a tlreat of serious injury.2 5
The statutory guidelines for the Commission in determining these
three crucial elements are set forth in qualitative terms.2 6 The domestic
industry must produce articles like or directly competitive with the
imported articles.27 The injury must be serious, and in measuring it the
export agreement after 1975, and moreover, the agreement had set a minimum price which
was required to be as high as the Japanese domestic price. In Mr. Baker's view, it would be
unwise to allow major 337 investigations when the complainant is unable to advance even a
prima facie case fulfilling the requirements of the anti-dumping, countervailing duty or
antitrust laws. He pointed out that a major portion of Japanese penetration of the American
market had been accounted for by Sony and Panasonic, which were not named as defendants
in the 337 proceeding and "which sell their sets at high& prices than those charged for
competing American sets." TRADE REGULATION REPORTS No. 274, at 15-16 (March 29, 1977).
There was also strong opposition by the President to the ITCls taking the welded steel
tubing case, but the Commission nevertheless is proceeding in both casds. Petition before the ITC,
American Metal Market 1 (Oct. 27, 1976). Decisions under § 337 to date have turned largely on
questions of patent infringement or franchising.
2019 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. V 1975).
2119 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
22Directions and rates of change in import volume will of course be affected by the date
of origin and the terminal date.
2319 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
241d.
25ld.
26Nowhere does the law use percentages or other quantitative measures.
2719 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
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Commission is to take into account relevant factors including "the
significant idling of productive facilities in the industry, the inability of a
significant number of firms to operate at a reasonable level of profit and
significant unemployment or underemployment within an industry." 2 A
threat of serious injury should be determined after evaluating a decline in
sales, higher and growing inventory and a downward trend in profits,
production, wages or employment.2 9 These economic indicators listed in
the statute are not, however, intended to be exclusive, and the Commission
may examine others that it believes to be relevant.3 0
Finally, before making a finding that a domestic industry deserves
relief, the Commission must conclude that imports are an important cause
of injury, and not less than any other cause. This definition of substantial
cause was introduced to replace the criterion used by the Commission in
applying the escape clause of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, whereby
the increased imports as a "major cause" had to be more important than
any other cause of injury.31 The requirement that the increase in imports be
caused by a trade agreement concession was stricken from the statute.
Although there are passages in the House and Senate reports on the
Trade Act of 1974 that throw light on the meaning of these key sections of
the law, 32 their illumination is dim and fitful. Both Senate and House
Committees keyed their discussion of "serious injury" to a few specific
examples.3 3 The most that one can deduce from the committee reports is
the obvious conclusion that Congress did not intend to denote as a
"substantial injury" a temporary reversal of fortune. One finds no effort
to provide guidelines for what might be a "significant" idle capacity or
level of unemployment or a "reasonable" level of profit. Nor did Congress
provide any indication of how a trend should be calculated or over what
time period, although the Senate report suggests that the date of the
Kennedy Round (1968) might serve as a point of departure. 34
The investigative experience of the Commission under the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 presumably is to be used in applying the import
injury provisions of the revised law; but key passages of earlier escape
clause findings in Tariff Commission decisions have unfortunately been
extremely terse at best. 35 In perhaps the only passage to expand on the
2819 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
2919 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
30The Commission is directed to take into account all economic factors which it
considers relevant. Relevant factors are not limited to those listed. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)
(Supp. V 1975).31See Adjustment Assistance, supra note 14, at 334-38; Hardship, supra note 14, at 798-
812.
32See H. REP. No. 93-471, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT]; S. REP. No. 93-1708, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
33HousE REPORT, supra note 32, at 47; SENATE REPORT, supra note 32, at 211-12.
"
4SENATE REPORT, supra note 32, at 120.
35See, e.g., BRASS WIND MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS & PARTS THEREOF, T. C. PUB. No. 539, at
4-8 (1973). (Views of Chairman Bedell, Vice Chairman Parker and Commissioner Moore in
support of an affirmative declaration); UMBRELLAS & PARTS THEREOF, T. C. PUB. No. 334, at 4-
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language of the statute relating to injury determination, the House Ways
and Means Committee remarked that the tests were intended only to be
suggestive, as the Commission's judgment would be determinative in the
last resort:
The Committee did not intend that an industry automatically would
satisfy the eligibility criteria for import relief by showing that all, or some
of the enumerated factors, were present at the time of its petition to the
Tariff Commission. That is a judgment to be made by the Tariff
Commission on the basis of all factors it considers relevant.6
In determining responsibility for import injury under the Trade Act of
1974, therefore, major conceptual problems remained to be resolved
by Trade Commission practice. In identifying an industry, what
reliance would be placed respectively on supply and demant substitutabi-
lities? Would both be marshalled before delimiting the industry? Would
the concept of cross-elasticity of demand be employed? Would an imported
article be held to compete with a product at an earlier stage of fabrication?
How would the Commission deal with differences in style between foreign
and domestic products? Would a product be considered directly competi-
tive with an import if it were superior or inferior technologically?
A second cluster of problems relates to measurement of injury. Is an
industry injured if some firms are prosperous and others are not? If
members of the industry produce several products, only one of which is
directly competitive with imports, and show losses only on this one
product while earning a reasonable overall return, is the industry injured?
When an industry normally realizes exceptionally high profits in periods
of prosperity, and very low earnings, or substantial losses in recession-in
other words, if the industry has a pattern of greater variability than the
average manufacturing firm-can a downswing be taken as evidence of
serious injury? Suppose that most firms in an industry fail to take
advantage of technical advances, thereby foregoing cost reductions. Can
they be injured or register injury because of their own sloth or negligence?
Some of these questions can perhaps be resolved by reference to the
stated purpose of the original "escape clause" continued in the Trade Act
of 1974.37 Public policy is to provide short term relief from import
competition to domestic producers so that they can regroup their forces to
meet unrestricted import competition in the future.38
12 (1970) (Considerations Supporting the Commission's Findings); NONRUBBER FOOTWEAR,
T. C. PUB. No. 276, at 3-6 (1969); WATCHES, T. C. PUB. No. 142, at 3-6 (1964) (Considerations
Supporting the Commission's Finding).
36HousE REPORT, supra note 32, at 47.
37 9 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (Supp. V 1975).
3819 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) (1) (Supp. V 1975). Import relief is to be accorded "to facilitate the
orderly adjustment to new competitive conditions .. ." 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (i) (1) (Supp. V 1975)
directs the Commission to "keep under review developments with respect to ... the progress
and specific efforts made by the firms in the industry concerned to adjust to import competition.
1977]
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With regard to the specific statutory tests of seriousness or intensity,
such as idling of production facilities, profit levels and unemployment, the
measurement problems are familiar to those economists who have tried to
develop standards of performance for industrial behavior. In the case of the
Trade Act of 1974, however, the purpose of the analysis is to determine
whether, because an industry fails to equal or achieve some norm, it can
therefore be found to be "injured." Here a basic difficulty, arising from the
economist's reliance on competition as a driving force and as a norm for
optimal behavior, must be confronted: How can the presence or absence of
injury be separated from the cause of the injury? Suppose that an industry,
disregarding for the moment the problems of its definition, fails to
innovate, ignores the demands of fashion or adopts a cartelized price
structure. Would economic analysis then characterize the consequences as
injury if profits were low, capacity under-utilized or unemployment higher
than the manufacturing average? In such a case, the term "self-inflicted
injury" might be used, although it brings in the element of cause.
For purposes of analysis, the difficulty will be provisionally resolved by
separating injury from its cause. The Commission decisions will be
reviewed on the assumption that it is admissible to conclude, on the sole
evidence of criteria such as changes in or levels of profit, that an industry
has been injured. For the moment, attention will be focused upon the
Commission's logic, consistency and conformity to norms of economic
analysis in determining the presence or absence of injury.
The final group of problems, and by all odds the most complex, is
rooted in the identification and ranking of causes for injury shown. Of
course, economics has limitations in demonstrating cause and effect other
than by the exercise of pure logic. No one supposes that the use of
quantitative methods alone can suffice to prove that variation in one type
of economic activity has been caused by changes in another even if
movement of the two variables seems to be closely associated.3 9 Ranking of
causes of injury, using econometric methods, might be carried out by
comparing the importance of coefficients related to each of several
variables.40 In a simpler analysis, one might compare percentage changes
.. ' when relief has been granted. Id. The Senate Finance Committee explicitly stated that
the "escape clause" should provide "temporary relief for an industry . . . so that the industry
will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer international competition." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 32, at 119. Moreover, the clause "is not intended to protect industries which fail to
help themselves become more competitive through reasonable research and investment efforts,
steps to improvef productivity and other measures that competitive industries must continually
undertake." Id. at 122.39An example is the still unresolved debate about the effect of monetary policy, i.e., the
quantity of money, on the price level.40For instance, the demonstrated percentage variation in production levels of an
identified domestic industry could be related to the percentage changes in imports, and to
other types of economic activity that conceivably might affect production levels in the
industry. This could be done via a multiple regression analysis that would take account of the
simultaneous or lagged influence of several variables. Any such analysis would necessitate the
proper specification of the equation or equations to be used. In investigations completed in
[Vol. 52:535
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in imports and domestic output on the assumption that where both are
measured in the same units, the importance of imports could be indicated
by the relative percentage changes.
Nevertheless, doubts exist regarding the propriety of relying completely
on these mathematical techniques. It is arguable that a domestic industry
might somehow be weakened by a long rise in the absolute level of imports,
although the theory of a cumulative impact would require careful and
detailed analyses of credit-worthiness, attraction of management and
consumer acceptance to become credible. Isolating long term effects would
be especially challenging where a recession and low profit rates or
employment declines were simultaneous. In interpreting the escape clause
under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the Tariff Commission held in
1969 that serious injury could be attributed to imports when, "but for" the
imports, a plant might have been able to stay in business. 41 Since the
Trade Act of 1974 was designed to moderate the causal requirements of the
1962 Trade Expansion Act,42 the revised statute and its application will be
examined to determine whether a "but for" criterion is now justified.
INDUSTRY DEFINITIONS AND ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
The standards for allowing adjustment assistance for firms and
workers under the Trade Act of 1974 are less stringent than for providing
import relief of other types, such as increases in duties or import
restrictions of other kinds, or if the President chooses, arrangement of an
orderly marketing agreement. 43 To be sure, the Commission may recom-
mend adjustment assistance as a remedy on the basis of its import injury
investigation, and the President may adopt adjustment assistance whether
or not it is recommended by the Commission. When assistance is recom-
1977, the Staff of the International Trade Commission appears to have used iuch procedures,
although the Commissioners for the most part ignore their efforts. But see FOOTWrEAR, U.S.I.T.C.
PUB. No. 699, at 24-25 nn. 1-2 (Feb. 1977) (views of Leonard) [hereinafter cited as FOOTWEAR];
TELEVISION REcEIvERS, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 808, at 24 n.1 (March 1977) (views of Chairman
Minchew & Comm'rs Leonard & Moore); SUGAR, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 807, at 54-55 (March 1977).
(views of Comm'rs Leornard & Ablondi).
41BuTrWELD PIPE, T.C. PuB. No. 297, at 12-13 (Nov. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
BUTTWELD PIPE]; TRANsMIssIoN TOWERS & PARTS, T.C. Pub. No. 298, at 10 (Nov. 1969).
See generally Hardship, supra note 14, at 797-99. "But for" did not prevail after 1969 in
escape clause decisions. Instead, inflation was held responsible for injury. In adjustment
assistance decisions, however, the "but for" advocates and their fellow commissioners
continued to disagree about its relevance and justification.
4219 U.S.C. § 1901 (3) (Supp. V 1975).
4 5Under 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (a) (4) (Supp. V 1975) the President may negotiate an "orderly
market agreement." Adjustment assistance for workers, for instance, may be obtained after the
Secretary of Labor certifies that a significant number of production workers in a firm or
subdivision have become totally or partially unemployed, that there has been a decrease in
sales and production, and that imports of articles competitive with those produced by workers'
firms contributed "importantly" to the unemployment and the sales decline. See 19 U.S.C. §
2272 (Supp. V 1975). The standards for eligibility and certification of a firm by the Secretary
of Commerce are identical with those that apply when workers seek adjustment assistance.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2341 (c) (Supp. V 1975).
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mended after an investigation by the Commission, imports must oe found to
be a "substantial" cause of serious injury-a much more restrictive require-
ment than that imports have contributed "importantly" to a "decline
in sales of production" and that a significant number or proportion of
workers have become totally or partially separated from their jobs."4
It is possible to view the Commission's criteria for findings of injury
under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 as identical, whether it was
considering industry, firm or worker applications for relief, because the
statute used the same phraseology for all.
In actuality, however, the standards necessarily differed depending upon
whether the issue was the effect of imports upon a firm or upon a group of
workers rather than an industry. In the case of individual firm or worker
petitions, the Tariff Commission reviewed the competitive posture of the
individual firms to determine whether they had installed up-to-date
equipment, were operated efficiently, used modern and aggressive market-
ing tactics, etc., in order to determine whether the increased imports had
been the major cause of the decline in sales and employment.45 Focusing
on the experience of a single plant or subdivision thereof could in some
cases make it easier to qualify for relief than if an entire industry's
performance were to be appraised. On the other hand, if imports injured
only one out of ten firms in the industry, the Tariff Commission would not
have held that imports were a major cause of serious injury;46 but the
application of workers in that particular firm might have been approved.
The Commissioners' statements and their analysis, therefore, were at once
more narrowly focused and more detailed when reviewing the workers'
petitions for adjustment assistance under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
than when the Commission investigated an industry. In all cases there had
to be a finding that the increased imports resulted in major part because of
a tariff concession, but the other criteria cannot depend on the same
economic approach in evaluating industry injury as in an appraisal of a
single firm or plant.47
Industry Definition Under the 1974 Trade Act
Prior to consideration of whether serious injury has occurred, the ITC
must define the industry. In so doing, it can draw on its experience in
44See 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (Supp. V 1975); 19 U.S.C. § 2341 (c) (Supp. V 1975).
45See Hardship, supra note 14, at 806-13, 816-21, 817 n.171.46
"[A]djustment assistance to firms and workers may be granted in many cases in which
there may be no basis for escape clause relief for the industry to which these firms and workers
belong." Hardship, supra note 14, at 823.
47For example, the Commission made no findings in the Brass Wind Instruments case,
being equally divided as to whether there has been serious injury to the industry. Yet in an
investigation of the effect of imports on one firm's workers, imports were found to cause
unemployment of a significant number of workers. See BRASS WIND MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS,
T.C. PUB. No. 480 (April 1972). The reasons for the difference in findings were
succinctly stated by Commission members Leonard and Young:
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carrying out fact-finding under the earlier escape clause legislation and in
applying the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921.48
An investigation under the escape clause may be launched by an entity
which is "representative of an industry." 49  The Commission has never
questioned the bona fides of petitioners to represent an industry. The
proceeding may be compared with that under the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, wherein injury to an industry, to a firm or to workers could be
relieved.5 0
In arriving at their industry definitions, the Commissioners have had to
reconcile discrepancies, at the outset of each proceeding, between the
product definitions in the tariff schedules and the customary definitions of
products adopted by domestic industries. The TSUS51 definitions are
sometimes broader, sometimes narrower than the corresponding domestic
items.52
[A]n affirmative determination for workers is not conditioned upon a finding
of serious injury or threat of injury to their firm. We take a similar position with
regard to an industry. An affirmative determination for workers rests in part on
unemployment or underemployment of workers, a finding of serious injury or
threat of injury to an industry rests on more than just unemployment or
underemployment of certain workers of that industry. Thus, a finding of serious
injury . . . to the industry is not a condition precedent to granting relief to the
workers.
BRASS WIND MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS AND PARTS THEREOF, T.C PUB. No. 539, at 11 (Jan. 1973).
The opinion also quoted the Eyeglass Frames case: "Under the 1962 Act, the
workers who are thus employed may be eligible for trade adjustment assistance,
in spite of the fact that the industry of which they are a part and the firm for which they work,
have suffered no injury at all." Id. (statement of Thunberg and Clubb). See also BUTrWELD
PIPE, supra note 41, at 11 n.7; Adjustment Assistance, supra note 14, at 326-28.
To the same effect was an earlier decision where a majority of the Commission rejected a
brief of the American Institute of Imported Steel, pointing out that
[T]here is a vast difference between the simple "unemployment or underemploy-
ment" test which is required in a workers' case and the "serious injury" test
required in an industry petition . . . [M]any workers and some firms within an
industry may become eligible for adjustment assistance, without the entire in-
dustry's suffering serious injury.
BUTTWELD PIPE, supra note 41, at 11 n.7.
4819 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
49Investigations may also be initiated upon request of the President, the Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate
Finance Committee or upon the Commission's own motion. To date in 1977, three reports
have been issued as a result of such requests, including inquiries into footwear by the Senate,
mushrooms by the President, and plant hangers by the ITC.
5019 U.S.C. § 1901 (a) (1) (1970). A petition for tariff adjustment could be filed by a trade
association, firm, certified or recognized union or "other representative of an industry." Cf. 19
U.S.C. § 2251 (a) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
51Tariff Schedules of the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).52For instance, stainless steel sheet width, according to the Tariff Schedules, is anything
larger than twelve inches. See 19 U.S.C. § 1202 Schedule 6, Pt. 2, Subpt. B, headnote 3(g)
(1970). "Sheets are flat rolled products, whether or not corrugated or crimped, in coils or cut
to length, under 0.1875 inches in thickness and over 12 inches in width," whereas according to
American Iron and Steel Institute's industry definition, sheet steel is twenty-four inches or
wider. See UNITED STATES STEEL, THE MAKING, SHAPING AND TREATING OF STEEL 912 (9th ed.
1965). Sometimes a product is hidden among others; the precise quantity of tool steel imports
cannot be determined because some forms are included in broad non-carbon steel classifica-
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That the definition of industry in reviewing the existence of injury can
be determinative was particularly well illustrated in the report on stainless
and alloy steel.53 Commissioner Ablondi accepted the petitioners' char-
acterization of the industry as being composed of all manufacturers of
specialty steel because of the ease with which facilities could be shifted
from the production of stainless bar and rod to alloy tool steel bar and rod.
Moreover, he quoted the petitioners' brief to the effect that the specialty
steel industry is "a cohesive, indivisible unit largely because of the
interchangeability of the means of production." 54 Commissioner Ablondi
pointed out that the same melting, blooming, pressing and hot rolling
facilities were used to produce stainless and alloy tool steel so that "two-
thirds of the cost of producing such articles is incurred in production
processes common to each article. '55 Most of the domestic firms, according
to Ablondi, produced a combination of alloy and stainless products, "often
in the same facilities. '56  On the basis of his single industry definition,
therefore, Ablondi found no injury from imports.
Although sheet and strip, bar and rod, and plate and alloy tool steel
were "often produced in the same plant complex," nevertheless, Com-
missioners Moore and Bedell held that there were four industries. 57
Chairman Leonard, on the other hand, supported his finding of the
existence of four groups, or industries, by the fact that each "is generally
produced in separate facilities." 58 Finally, Commissioner Minchew lumped
together all flat-rolled products, and all stainless bar and rod, while
distinguishing alloy tool steel, on the grounds that stainless steel producers
generally had two manufacturing divisions, one for flat-rolled products and
one for bar and rod, if they produced these two groups of products.5 9 It is
tions. The Tariff Schedules under 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) do not separately classify, as such, all
types of alloy tool steel. The Tariff Schedule of the U.S. Annotated (1975) see T.C. PUB. No. 704
(1974), shows alloy high speed tool imports separately for some items, but does not separately
classify all alloy tool steels. See, e.g., T.S.U.S.A. 608.88.05 alloy high speed tool steel plate
and 608.88.30 which may include alloy tool with other alloy steel plate. Some forms of tool
steel are included in classes labeled "other." SPECIALTY STEEL, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 756, at 25
n. I (Jan. 1976) [hereinafter cited as SPECIALTY STEEL]. Alloy tool steels are melted in electric
furnaces and specially processed to produce a steel noted for its hardness, strength and
resistance to wear, abrasion and heat, and include relatively low-alloy, intermediate alloy and
high alloy steels. UNITED STATES STEEL, THE MAKING, SHAPING AND TREATING OF STEEL 1095-
1097 (8th ed. 1964). Although round stainless steel wire is given special T.S.U.S.
classification, neither the American Iron and Steel Institute nor the Census of Manufacturers
separates round from other shapes of stainless steel wire. Cf. Tariff Schedules of the United
States Annotated 609.4510 and 609.4540 and Form 16-S of the American Iron and Steel
Institute and Census of Manufacturers Product Code 331551. In the case of plant hangers, the
Tariff Schedule seven digit items include "numerous other articles," such as wall hangings, so
that the ITC was forced to depend on questionnaires to importers for its estimates of plant
hanger imports. See PLANT HANGERS, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 797, at 12, 18 (Dec. 1976).53See SPECIALTY STEEL, suproa note 52.
5
1SPECIALITY STEEL, supra note 52, at 50 (citing Petitioners' Brief, p. 7).
55/d. at 7.
561d. at 7.571d. at 8.
511d. at 17.
59Id. at 36-37.
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impossible to reconcile the reasons given in the commissioners' views in
support of the findings that different industries exist.
60
The Trade Act of 1974 provides broad guidelines to relate an imported
product to a domestic industry, but not much more.6' The Commission
may exclude from a domestic industry that part of the production which is
imported, but it is not required to do so. The Commission may, when a
domestic producer makes more than one article, include only those which
are like or directly competitive with imports. And a geographic area may
be carved out of the United States when the production there is a
substantial part of American production, sales are concentrated there, and
imports likewise. 62
In typical decisions under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 the
Commission seemed to give weight to both production flexibility and to
demand in its industry definitions. 63  The provisions of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 that referred to import of an article and to injury of
a domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with
the imported article have not been amended in the Trade Act of 1974 in any
way that would call for the International Trade Commission, as successor
to the Traffic Commission, to alter its approach.64
In any event, a review of the findings on industry definition under the
1974 Act should be useful, if only to see how the Commission has
601n the Specialty Steel case, it is noteworthy that the "Information Obtained in the
Investigation," while it contained language that supported Minchew's division between flat-
rolled products and bars and rods, accepted testimony by the specialty steel group vice
president of Colt Industries minimizing the expenditures necessary to switch from stainless to
alloy tool steel bar and rod. Id. at 12. According to the "Information," the flat-roiled facilities
of Allegheny-Ludlum and Crucible are geographically and functionally separate from their
rod and bar mills, but aside from this brief reference nothing appears in the Specialty Steel
report to show whether or not Carpenter, Armco or Cyclops produce both types of rolled
products in the same establishment.6 1See 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (b) (3) (A), (B) and (C) (Supp. V 1975).
6219 U.S.C. § 2251 (b) (3) (C) (Supp. V 1975).
63in analyzing footwear, for instance, it found that a "clear breakdown" could be made
among shoes depending on (1) type of construction, (2) sex and age of users and (3) use.
Accordingly, it listed five industries, each composed of plants or portions of plants "which in
general produce the product indicated." These industries were men's dress/casuals, women's
dress/casuals, athletic, work and slipper industries. NONRUBBER FOOTWEAR, T.C. PUB. No. 359, at
3 (Jan. 1971) [hereinafter cited as NONRUBBER FOOTWEAR]. And in its report on Flat Glass and
Tempered Glass, all members of the Commission were in agreeemnt in distinguishing among
various types of flat glass-sheet, plate, float, rolled and polished ware. Plate and float were,
however, interchangeable in use and not directly competitive with window and thin sheet
glass. Hence, sheet glass was found to be a distinct article and an "industry." FLAT GLAss &
TEMPERED GLASS, T.C. PUB. No. 459, at 6-7 (Jan. 1972) (Views of Chairman Bedell and
Commissioners Sutton & Moore).641In defining "directly competitive with" a domestic article, the Trade Act of 1974
introduced one modification. An imported article is directly competitive with a domestic
product at an earlier or a later processing stage if the imported product has the same effect as
would the import of articles at the same stage of processing as the domestic product. An
unprocessed article is to be regarded as at an earlier stage of processing. See 19 U.S.C. § 2481
(5) (Supp. V 1975). Imports of frozen, prepared and chilled shrimp were held to be directly
competitive with the shrimp fishing, as distinguished from shrimp processing, industry.
SHRIMP, U.S.I.T.C. Pua. No. 773, at 2 (May 1976) [hereinafter cited as SHRIMP].
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attempted to resolve the problems listed earlier.65 When the Commission
and its staff have had the benefit of numerous previous escape clause
proceedings and investigations at the President's request, it is unlikely that
the industry would be differently defined. Nevertheless, t6 the extent that
industry definitions were structured to correspond to tariff reductions
resulting from trade agreements in previous escape clause proceedings, the
revisions of the Trade Act of 1974 should provide broader scope to the
Commission in applying economic analysis to the problem. The Com-
mission has been forthright in holding that it can carve out 6f a
domestic industry producing like or directly competitive articles, two or
more industries capable of being injured.66
When some firms import part of their rquirements, own facilities
overseas or have components out of the country for assembly, delimitation
65 t is important to alert the reader to the fact that the Report to the President is brief. It
consists of the Commission's "Determinations, Findings and Recommendations" where
affirmative, or the "Determination" when negative, in two or three pages, with only a few
sentences devoted to the conclusions of the Commission as a body that a domestic industry has
or has not been seriously injured by imports. In their "views" the commissioners jointly or
separately arrive at a particular industry definition, find serious injury or lack of it, and assess
the responsibility of imports for injury if any is found. These views are, unfortunately,
usually written without specific reference to testimony at the public hearings on petitions, to
the briefs of the parties or even to the much lengthier "Information Obtained in the
Investigation," prepared by the ITC staff, which accompanies the Report to the President. See,
e.g., MUsHRooMs, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 798 (Jan. 1977) [hereinafter cited as MUSHROOMs]. The
Commission's determinations, findings and recommendations including the proposed tariff-
rate quota proposal, took up slightly more than a page. The Information filled eighty-nine
pages. Twenty-eight pages sufficed for five separate *Commissioners' views.
More important, as an obstacle to generalization with regard to Commission policy,
each Commissioner is free to write his own views which, even though arriving at the same
finding with regard to the import responsible for injury as his brethren, may differ on industry
definition.66For example, in the Industrial Fasteners report, Chairman Leonard concluded that
there were two groups of producers consdtutihg two distinct industries, one making nuts,
bolts and large screws, the other producing small screws. BOLTS, NUTS & SCREWS OF IRON &
STEEL, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 747, at 7 (Nov. 1975) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL FASTENERS].
Commissioner Moore, however, found there was only one industry. Id. at 18. Two
commissioners agreed with Leonard that there were two industries, but in the case of the
"large" screw industry found substantial injury from imports but no injury or threat of injury
to the "small" screw industry. Id. at 34 (Views of Vice Chairman Minchew & Commissioner
Bedell). Since the commissioners rarely footnote their views, it is almost impossible to trace
divergent facts or interpretations to their sources.
In the footwear investigation, where the Commission was unanimous in concluding that
there had been serious injury to the domestic industry because of the import of nonrubber
footwear, there was diversity in the commissioners' industry definitions. Minchew found that
there was a single industry made up of producers of both rubber and nonrubber footwear.
FOOTWEAR, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 748, at 10 (Feb. 1976) (Minchew and Parker) [hereinafter cited
as FOOTWEAR 1976]. Parker, who except for the industry definition wrote a joint statement
with Commissioner Minchew, regarded the industry which was injured as consisting of
facilities producing shoes marketed in competition with nonrubber footwear imports, but
nonetheless, for purposes of injury analysis, treated the industry as composed of all footwear
manufacturers. Id. at 10. Chairman Leonard believed that because consumers purchase
footwear for one purpose-"to cover and protect their feet"-domestic facilities engaged in
production of all types and styles of footwear should be viewed as part of one industry. Id. at
29-30. Commissioner Moore, however, found that there were five industries in conformity
with the Commission's most recent report to the President under the Trade Expansion Act of
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of a domestic industry proves elusive. The world leader in slide fasteners,
the Japanese firm YKK, exports parts to America where it has several
assembly plants. Many domestic producers also assemble imported parts.
Should the industry then be defined as those domestic producers manu-
facturing zippers exclusively from domestically fabricated parts or the
manufacturer4 of zippers with more than fifty percent by value of domestic
parts? Should the domestic industry be considered to be the manufacture of
zippers and/or parts?67
In the Stainless Steel Table Flatware case, the second largest domestic
producer, Insilco, had acquired a facility in Taiwan from which it
imported economy-grade flatware, and Oneida, the largest producer,
imported from Korea and Japan.68 Taking into account these facts, which
were not mentioned in any commissioner's statement, might have led to a
definition of the domestic industry that would have minimized the
possibility of injury from imports. They help to explain Commissioner
Ablondi's comment that "certain major import interests" told the ITC that
failure to take affirmative action would "result in serious detriment to the
domestic industry. '69
1962, although Moore did not refer to the earlier definition. Id. at 48. Commissioner Bedell
agreed with Commissioner Parker that the industry should be defined as the production of
nonrubber footwear, id. at 59, and Commissioner Ablondi was of the same opinion. Id. at 74.67See SLIDE FASTENERS & PARTS THEREOF, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 747, at 15 (Feb. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as SLIDE FASTENERS].
Although tables were compiled on various bases in the accompanying Information,
five commissioners concluded in their statements that the domestic industry should consist of
the facilities devoted to the production of zippers and parts. Commissioner Minchew
expressly included YKK's U.S. facilities in the domestic industry. Id. at 24.
Analysis of the slide fastener market is rendered difficult by Japanese dominance of
both imports and, apparently, the domestic industry as well, which sharply limited the
presentation of information by the ITC. The views of the commissioners are peppered with
asterisks that make it almost impossible to determine even the level of imports and of domestic
production. The statements of Moore, Parker and Ablondi omitted the number of units of
slide fasterners imported in 1970 and 1974, and Commissioners Leonard and Bedell omitted
these data for 1970 and 1972, as well as the percentage by which imports dropped from 1972 to
1973, and 1973 to 1974. These omissions can be filled in from Table 1 of the Information;
presumably it was felt that disclosure would reveal the volume of business of YKK. The exact
percentage of YKK's imports to total imports was omitted from Minchew's statement. Id. at
25. Some of these omissions are pointless, since the Department of Commerce provides import
data by country. YKK was presumably the sole Japanese exporter, and Japan accounted for at
least eighty percent of U.S. imports by quantity of slide fasteners and parts. Id. at 64 (Table
2). Even more mysterious was the omission of data on domestic shipments. Although there
were sixty-eight manufacturers of fasteners, including assemblers and parts manufacturers,
and 104 establishments, the volume of shipments was published only for domestically
produced merchandise, less units in which imported parts accounted for the chief value. Id. at
27. It is difficult to see what competitive secret would have been" revealed by releasing figures
on total shipments. The Commission's policy of concealing information on domestic
industries leaves many reports so denuded of data that it is well-nigh impossible to put the
findings in perspective. In FOOTWEAR, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 799 (Feb. 1977) [hereinafter cited
as FOOTWEAR 1977], Appendix C's heading is replaced by asterisks so that we are not even
permitted to know the subject matter of pages D-I - D-17, which are completely blank.6SSTAINLESS STEEL TABLE FLATWARE, U.S.I.T.C. PuB. No. 759, at 27 (March 1976)
[hereinafter cited as STAINLESS FLATWARE]. In the Canned Mushrooms case five of twenty-
nine canning firms imported canned mushrooms. MUSHROOMS, supra note 65, at 9, 14.69STAINLESS FLATWARE, supra note 68, at 45. Insilco had acquired an importer, Stanley
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As a result of a petition filed by the National Shrimp Congress, the
Trade Commission conducted an investigation into the effect of the import
of fresh, chilled, frozen, prepared or preserved shrimp on two industries:
shrimp boat owners and shrimp processors.7 0 Shrimp processors, whose
representatives opposed the petition, can or otherwise process imported
shrimp. Under the Trade Act, however, an imported article can be
"directly competitive" with a domestic article at an earlier or a later stage
of processing if the import has an economic effect on producers of the
domestic article "comparable to the effect of importation of articles in the
same stage of processing as the domestic article."' Hence, the shrimp
fishing industry could be regarded as directly competitive with the import
of frozen or canned shrimp if the effect of such imports were comparable to
the import of freshly-caught shrimp. The imported articles consisted of
both fresh and processed shrimp, lumped together in item 114.45 of the
Tariff Schedules. Since according to Chairman Leonard and Com-
missioner Ablondi, "most of the shrimp which are imported into the
United States enter in a processed form (mostly frozen), the domestic
shrimp-fishing industry" could be said to be producing an article directly
competitive with the imported processed shrimp.7 2
Industry Boundaries and Product Definitions
The petitions leading to investigation under the Trade Act of 1974 have
been filed by firms, by trade associations, or committees of domestic
producers in which labor unions have sometimes joined. 3 In defining the
industry which might be injured, however, the Commission is not bound
to accept the petitioner's concept.7 4 Nevertheless, the Act, as it has been
Roberts, to strengthen its competitive position in middle-priced and higher-priced flatware,
but was forced to divest by the Justice Department in 1973. Id. at A-27.
70 SHRIMP, supra note 64, at 1-2.
7119 U.S.C. § 2481 (5) (Supp. V 1975). See discussion accompanying note 64 supra.
7 2 SHRIMP, supra note 64, at 20-21.
Their fellow commissioners did not bother to ask whether frozen shrimp were directly
competitive with fresh shrimp but proceeded directly to the question of whether imports had
injured the shrimp fishing industry (Minchew, Moore & Parker). Id. at 7-10 (Views of Vice
Chairman Minchew), 15-17 (Views of Commissioners Moore & Parker). Much the same issue
was presented in ASPARAGUS, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 755 (Jan. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
ASPARAGUS]. Although fresh, canned and frozen asparagus was imported and all commis-
sioners agreed that processing asparagus constituted a different industry from freezing or
growing asparagus, both the affirmative and negative commissioners referred to total
asparagus imports, not differentiating between processed and fresh. Id. at 17. Those
commissioners who found that the domestic growers were injured argued that canned and
frozen asparagus displaced domestic fresh asparagus from the processing market. Id. at 26
(Views of Commissioners Moore & Bedell).
73The investigation resulting in the Specialty Steel report was instituted on receipt of a
petition filed by the Tool and Stainless Steel Industry Committee for Import Relief; the
United Steel Industry Committee for Import Relief; and the United Steelworkers of America.
See SPECIALITY STEEL, supra note 52, at 1.74The Commission may ignore imports by a domestic producer, other products
manufactured by a producer that are not subject to import competition, and production in
geographic areas not subject to import competition. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
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interpreted by the Commission, appears to provide the complaining
domestic firms with a ready-made procedure for establishing an ad hoc
industry where this will be to their advantage. The petitions generally
allege that certain articles imported under designated tariff schedules are
causing injury to the industry. Following the scope for its findings, the
Commission attempts to determine which firms produce articles like or
directly competitive with those named in the petitions; 75 which producers
and importers are selected to receive questionnaires 76 is generally deter-
mined by reference to the imported products which have allegedly injured
an industry. Obviously, this aspect of the investigations does not always
lead to bizarre or deformed industry definitions. In certain cases, however,
the issue can be of strategic importance and has not always been decided
logically.77
In the first report to be handed down under the Trade Act of 1974, the
consequences of identifying an industry by reference to the imported
product were apparent. The petition was filed by one firm, Columbia
Plywood, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Columbia Corporation of
Portland, Oregon. The petitioner was not a manufacturer of birch
But it is not required to do so. The House Ways and Means Committee, in reporting out the
bill that contained the same language as the Trade Act as passed, stated that the Commission
should look at the performance of an establishment as a whole if several product lines were
produced. "The Commission would not be expected to find import injury .. . if serious
injury did not exist with respect to its operations as a whole." HousE REPORT, supra
note 32, at 16. "The extent to which the products of a multi-product establishment
can be separately considered is necessarily affected by the accounting procedures that prevail
in a given case and the practicability of distinguishing or separating the operations of each
product line." Id. at 45-46. The Senate Committee on Finance, however, reached the
conclusion that the Commission "could choose to treat ... only that portion or subdivision of
the producer which produces the like or directly competitive article." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 32, at 122. Since the House had been more precise in its review of the
problem, and the Senate's language could be interpreted to refer to firms, the Commission has
certainly been free to conduct its investigation in terms of establishments. At the very least, it
should, when asking for cost and profit information on product lines, have discussed in its
reports, or in the staff informations, the accounting principles used in reaching profits
estimates. In the Asparagus report, it was admitted that growers did not keep separate reports
on their asparagus operations. See ASPARAGUS, supra note 72, at 13. In the Specialty Steel
case, mills produced other steel products in addition to alloy and stainless. In securing
financial data from the producers of stainless and alloy tool steel, the staff noted that "for
some expense items the amount applicable to stainless steel and tool steel, produced in your
establishment(s) cannot be ascertained directly from your records." The respondents could
allocate, but "[a]llocation of manufacturing expenses on the basis of sales is not acceptable."
Allocation methods were to be explained. U.S.I.T.C., QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PRODUCERS OF
STAINLESS STEEL AND TOOL STEEL 23 (1975). In the report to the President, the Information
presented profits both on an over-all basis for establishments, and by product line for the
articles in question. SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, Tables 44-45. There was no discussion
of accounting methods.
7519 U.S.C. §§ 2251(b)(3), 2482(5) (Supp. V 1975).76The items listed in ITC questionnaires include prices, costs and estimated profit and
loss, capacity, etc. The Commission relies on interviews and questionnaires along with other
material for information not found in census publications or trade journals.
771t is not clear, for instance, why the Commission decided to create a separate industry
of birch plywood doorskins. See BIRCH PLYWOOD DOORSKINS, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 743, at 19-
21 (Oct. 1975) [hereinafter cited as BIRCH PLYWOOD].
1977]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
doorskins at the time of the proceeding. Its division, Allen Quimby Veneer
Co., had stopped producing birch doorskins in 1974. Except for Com-
missioner Minchew, the Commission did not explore the economic limits
of the domestic industry. Minchew conceded that it "might be arguable
that hardboard doorskins may be 'directly competitive' with birch door-
skins" but stated that their nature was different, "particularly regarding
appearance."78
In the Specialty Steel case, acceptance of the industry as defined by the
petitioners-specialty steel-could lead to different conclusions about
injury from those that result from subdividing the firms into industries
equivalent to different products.7 9 And in footwear, the importers strongly
urged that a large proportion of imports consisted of styles or types that
were not available in the United States. Hence, it was argued, the
determination of which shoes were "like or directly competitive" should
have required rather careful analysis.8 0 The commissioners gave short
shrift to this argument, apparently on the grounds of production substi-
tutability.8 '
The process of defining an industry, accordingly, often impales the
Trade Commission on a dilemma. The excuse for the application of the
escape clause lies in the possibility that tariff reductions may injure
American industries, firms or workers. Article XIX of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) provides that if, as a result of
unforeseen developments, including tariff concessions, a product is im-
ported in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers the concessions may be modified or withdrawn. 2 The
GATT provision refers to producers, 83 which could mean individual firms
and workers. In taking account of the essentials of the GATT provision in
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and then the Trade Act of 1974,
Congress has never made it clear whether, to obtain relief, the firms, as
7 8 BIRCH PLYWOOD, supra note 77. The "Information" found that plywood doorskins for
hollow core flush doors were made primarily from birch, oak and lauan, but that sen, shina,
beach and other woods were also used. Id. at 25-26. In 1974 only twelve plants had produced
plywood doorskins and four of these for internal consumption only, id. atA-10, A-20, since they
manufactured flush doors. There were apparently only three plants manufacturing both
doorskins in 1974, although any plant making doorskins could also manufacture birch
doorskins. When Quimby was shut down, employment in the "industry" dropped from 400
to 100. Id. at 28 (Minchew). See id. atA-50-51. According to the "Information," there are about
510 square fee of doorskins for every housing start. Average birch skin per housing start in
1971-1974 was about 800 square feet. In an effort to preserve business secrecy, asterisks conceal
the production of hardboard doorskins in the United States. See id. at A-78 (Table 23).79See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra. If the industry comprised stainless steel
products and alloy tool steel, there was no evidence of increased imports and, hence, no basis
for import relief.
8 0Post-hearing submission of Volume Footwear Retailers of America in connection with
the escape clause investigation concerning nonrubber footwear, December 29, 1975, Theodore
R. Gates Associates, Economic Brief, at 38-44 [hereinafter cited as Economic Brief]. See
FOOTWEAR 1976, supra note 66.
8 FooTWEAR 1976, supra note 66, at 10 (view of Minchew), 30 (view of Leonard).
8261 Stat Pt. 5, A-58-59 (1947).
83M.
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enterprises, must be injured as enterprises or whether they need only be
injured in that part of their activities relating to the imported articles. The
latter standard makes it much easier for a domestic firm to show that
imports of one article are causing injury, even though this item may
account for less than one tenth of one percent of its revenues.84
Nevertheless; the GATT Article XIX, tariff schedules, and trade
agreements focus on and are expressed in terms of products or groups of
products. 85 Were the Commission to invariably employ a broad industry
definition or even to rely exclusively on the standard industrial classifica-
tion definitions used by the Census of Manufacturers, it is possible that
some cases of injury would be overlooked. 86
There are some practical approaches that seem inherently reasonable in
the light of problems that everywhere face an economist or policymaker in
trying to measure a relevant market. A market or an industry should be
defined only in terms tied to the purpose of analysis. In an antitrust case
the relevant market is that within which a particular business practice may
substantially affect the vigor of competition. In an import injury case the
industry or market should, of course, be related to imported products, but it
need not be identical with them.
A reasonable compromise might be first to determine which domestic
products are like or directly competitive with the imports named in the
petition, and then to proceed to determine the industry which produces
these products. But in the determination of the industry boundaries, the
Commission should not restrict itself exclusively to production activities
that are exclusively associated with items identical to import articles. If one
percent of a plant's domestice output consists of the product subject to
import competition, or if one plant out of dozens producing similar but
not identical articles is "injured," the Commission should test the injury by
reference to a wider industry definition than that suggested by the
petitioners.
It would be enlightening if the Commission had spelled out, in those
investigations where the issue was important, how it reconciled its industry
definition with that of the Census.87 Is there an asparagus industry, or is
84See IRON BLUE PIGMENTS, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 767, at 27 (Apr. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
IRON BLUE PIGMENTS].
8561 Stat. Pt. 5, A-58-59 (1947). Trade agreements and tariff schedules must be enforced
in terms of specific products.
86Both tariff schedules and the Census Standard Industrial Classifications may "have
long ceased to have any meaningful relation to commercial reality." Economic Brief, supra
note 80, at 2.871n the specialty steel industry, for instance, or even stainless steel wire, the Census
establishments often ship more products than are included in the industry definitions adopted
by the Trade Commission. Total net sales of stainless steel and alloy steel as percentages of
overall establishment net sales ranged from sixty-six to seventy-two percent. See SPECIALTY
STEEL, supra note 52, at 68. Many of the producers of round stainless wire did not provide data
to the Trade Commission; they produced other types of wire on the same equipment used for
producing stainless steel wire, and they were unable to segregate costs and profits. See ROUND
STAINLESS STEEL WIRE, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 779, at 42 (June 1976). Actually, of the fifty or
sixty wire drawers in the United States, there were only four which confined their activities
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the industry market gardening or raising root crops? As some of the
commissioner's have indicated, the possibilities of substituting one pro-
duct for another with the producers' existing facilities should be carefully
considered. 88 Yet the data provided in the reports have rarely been sufficient
to resolve the question.
MEASURING THE DEGREE OF INJURY
As in reaching its definition of an industry, the Trade Commission
should be able to rely on many years of experience in the determination of
the existence of a serious injury in its investigations under the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 195189 and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 90
In neither of these statutes had the key language been changed, probably
because, as noted earlier, it had been taken directly from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 9' In retaining the phraseology of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress, as Chairman Leonard and
Commissioner Moore pointed out, was aware of past Commission interpre-
tations of "serious injury"92 and that findings of injury had "rested heavily
on findings of plant closings, declining employment, and rapidly deteriora-
ting, low, or nonexistent profits, or losses." 93  Previous Commission
findings had not equated injury with "weakness or vulnerability of a
petitioning firm." 94 Where, however, an industry injury was shown, the
conventional indicia had to be supported by impact on all or most of the
firms.95
Commissioners Moore and Clubb had emphasized that "[s]erious
injury for purposes of the Trade Expansion Act is an important, crippling
or mortal injury; one having permanent or lasting consequences. '96 Yet the
report embodying this quotation illustrates the truly fuzzy nature of the
injury concept. A majority of the sitting commissioners found in the
affirmative that the piano industry was not being seriously injured, there
solely to producing stainless steel round wire. Round Stainless Steel Wire Investigation, No.
TA-201.-12, at 388 (March 28, 1976) (statement of J. Dirlam). See also statement of J. Dirlam,
before the United States International Trade Commission, Investigation No. TA-201-12.
Appendix A (March 28, 1976).
t8ASPARAGUS, supra note 72, at 13.
8919 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1970).
9019 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(3) (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2072 (1975).
91See note 8 supra.92See INDUSTRIAL FASTENERS, supra note 66, at 9 (views of Chairman Leonard), 19 (views
of Commissioner Moore).
931d.
94See NATIONAL TILE & MFG. Co., T.C. PuB. No. 145, at 7 (Dec. 1964) (Views of
Chairman Dorfman & Commissioner Sutton).
95For example, the umbrella frame industry was injured, according to a 1970 report,
because production was down, facilities were idled, profit levels low and employment had
declined. The number of firms had dropped from five in 1956 to two in 1966. UMBRELLAS &
METAL PARTS THEREOF, T.C. PUB. No. 334, at 10 (Aug. 1970) (dissent of Commissioner
Leonard). All commissioners found that the domestic industry had been injured. Only
Leonard attributed increased imports to a trade agreement concession.96PIANOS & PARTS THEREOF, T.C. PUB. No. 309, at 6 (Dec. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
PIANOS], cited in INDUSTRIAL FASTENERS, supra note 66, at 19 (views of Commissioner Moore).
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was only a threat of serious injury.97 How can one measure threat? The
evidence relied upon by the majority of the Commission cited declining
domestic consumption and rapidly increasing imports, a decline in profits
and the closing of five small plants since 1962.98 Yet, as the dissenting
Commissioners showed, the threatened injury faced by the piano industry
merely reflected "alternative recreational and cultural opportunities and
declining interest in the piano as such."9 9 Actually there was little to show
injury, stagnation would be a more appropriate characterization.100
One can trace the transmutations of the Commission's criteria for
measuring the seriousness of injury for a single industry through its reports
on nonrubber footwear. In 1969 the Commission found that large domestic
footwear manufacturing firms accounted for fifteen percent of the total
quanity of nonrubber footwear imported in 1967.101 Productivity had
increased due to new styles and materials which had greatly altered the
product mix, and to technological improvements. 0 2 Larger companies
were more profitable than smaller ones, but only the twelve largest
companies released comparable financial data, and they had sources of
revenue other than footwear manufacture. 0 3 The Commission concluded
that some of the smaller producers probably could continue to operate at
low levels of profits, but they would be vulnerable to competition from
sales by their larger domestic competitors and by other types of footwear. 10 4
Two years later the President again requested a Tariff Commission
investigation.0 - Commissioners Clubb and Moore found that there had
been constant movement of marginal firms, predominately small pro-
ducers, into and out of the industry during the decade of the 1960's.106
Nevertheless, the drop in the output and profits in 1969 and 1970,
combined with the fact that smaller producers suffered most, led to the
97See PIANOS, supra note 96, at 7.
9"See id. at 7.
99See id. at 19.
'"°See id. at 19.
'
0 1 NONRbBBER FOOTWEAR, supra note 63, at 20-22.
"02See id. at 57.
"o'See NONRUBBER FOOTWEAR, T.C. PUB. No. 276, at 60 (Jan. 1969).
'"Id. at 64-65. In a brief report on an investigation conducted on its own motion a few
months later, the Commission reviewed competition at the retail level on the basis of
interviews with major retailers and questionnaire returns from producers and importers. It
concluded that nonrubber footwear is a highly differentiated product, that changing
merchandising patterns including discount houses and nonfood items in supermarkets
adversely affect small producers. Manufacturers of quality products maintained their
position. See NONRUBBER FOOTWEAR, T.C. PuB. No. 307, at 22 (Dec. 1969).
'"-This request followed a Presidential Task Force report which found no specific
evidence that would enable it to single out the effect of imports, but the Task Force suggested
that with the Commission's powers of subponena and access to confidential business data, it
might conclusively determine whether the imports were a cause of serious injury to the
industry producing men's and women's leather footwear. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE ON NONRUBBER FOOTWEAR 62-65 (1970).
106471 plants had been closed and 358 opened. See NONRUBBER FOOTWEAR, supra note 63,
at 20 (views of Commissioners Clubb and Moore).
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conclusion that there was a threat of serious injury. 107 Commissioner
Leonard observed:
The industry is composed of a very large number of small producers who
lack adequate financial resources and are otherwise ill equipped to adjust
to the rapid proliferation of new styles and material, increased imports
from low-wage countries, changing technology, new marketing techniques
and a cost-price squeeze of impressive proportions .... Even if footwear
supplies from abroad is ignored, the problems of the industry are
monumental. 108
No relief having been obtained under the Trade Expansion Act, the
footwear industry'0 9 filed a petition for import relief under the Trade Act of
1974.110 Commissioner Minchew, joined by Commissioner Parker, again
held that there was serious injury, relying on a decline in the number of
firms from 1967 to 1974, a drop of forty-nine percent in profits for firms
producing nonrubber footwear,"' a fall in production in every year since
1968, a variable profit and loss experience with a significant number of
firms operating at a loss, and a rise in percentage of the insured
unemployed in the "leather and leather products industry." On the other
hand, no separate unemployment data were available for the nonrubber
footwear industry." 2 Chairman Leonard commented that the government
has a tendency to study a topic almost to death and hoped that the
Commission's unanimous finding of injury in the footwear case would
result in "maybe, just maybe" action that would take the place of further
study." 3
A further example may be drawn from inquiries into stainless steel and
alloy tool steel, where a majority of the Commission also found that there
had been serious injury to certain industries limited according to standards
discussed earlier, capacity utilization, unemployment and profits." 4 No-
where in this report nor any other under the Trade Act of 1974, is there a
table showing return on equity or investment, nor any recognition that
such a ratio might be pertinent to a finding of injury.
0 1d. at 20-22.
1081d. at 47. The Commission was evenly divided as to whether a tariff concession had
accounted in major part for increased imports, thus no remedy was recommended.
'
09Represented by the American Footwear Industries Association, the Boot and Shoe
Workers Union, and the United Shoe Workers of America.
"
0FooTwER 1976, supra note 66, at 1.
"Id. at 14. In fact, the drop appears to have been thirty-seven percent. See id. at 15.
121d. at 16.
"3This hope was not realized. Because the Commission did not muster a majority for a
single recommendation, the President opted for adjustment assistance, without danger of a
Congressional override. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR U.S. FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY, H.R. Doc.
No. 94-458, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Through January, 1977, only eleven firms had filed
for financial assistance with the Department of Commerce. See FooTWEAR 1977, supra note
67, at 47 (views of Commissioner Ablondi). Leonard supported his finding of serious injury
by reference to a decline in all footwear firms from 597 in 1969 to 409 in 1974, and in
establishments from nine hundred to somewhere between seven and eight hundred in 1974.
See FOOTWEAR 1976, supra note 66, at 35. Estimated use of capacity had fallen from eighty-
three percent in 1968 to seventy-two percent in 1974. As for losses, 33 of the 125 firms making
financial data available had losses in their shoe operations in 1974. Thus, 25 percent of the
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During the recession of late 1974-1975, the speciality steel industry
could hardly have avoided suffering from lower capacity utilization, employ-
ment and profits. Yet Chairman Leonard's only reference to a decline in
employment was based on the 1975 levels." 5 If a finding of serious injury
must be based on the presence, as Commissioner Moore had so carefully
explained in his Industrial Fasteners decision, of a crippling or mortal
injury" 6 with long term consequences," 7 it is difficult to understand how
any of the two-year comparisons used in the Speciality Steel report could
even hint at such a grievous plight for the industry." 8 Going further, one
may question whether the data were not biased to show injury. For most of
1974, domestic customers, on allocations for all stainless steel products,
were double and triple ordering in a desperate effort to corral scarce
industry might have been operating at a loss in 1974. The smaller the firm, the lower the
comparative percentages of profits to sales. Employment had fallen from 196,000 in 1971, to
177,000 in 1974, and dropped further in 1975. Id. at 36 (views of Commissioner Leonard).
Similar data were used by Commissioner Moore. Commissioner Moore's statement was
enlivened by a chart of production, broken down to be consistent with his determination that
there were five different footwear industries, each of which showed a decline in production
from 1968 to 1974. Id. at 49. Net operating profits for all domestic producers of nonrubber
footwear were $189 million in 1974, versus $186 million in 1975. Id. at 51. Commissioner
Bedell made similar findings. She compared the ratio of net operating profit to net sales after
taxes for all domestic manufacturers with the ratio for the footwear industry; 2.6 percent for
footwear in 1973 compared with 4.7 percent for all-manufacturing. Of course, she was obliged
to rely on the data from the same 125 large firms that had made financial disclosures to the
Commission. Id. at 61.
"
4Commissioners Bedell and Moore found low levels of capacity utilization (57 percent
for plates, sheet and strip, and 69 percent for stainless bar and rod, and for alloy tool steel) for
the part of the year 1973 as well as all of 1974 and 1975. SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at 11.
It has proved impossible to check the data in this opinion. According to responses to the ITC
questionnaire (itself subject to question because of its definition of capacity) in 1974, steel
plates, sheet and strip capacity operated at 75.7 percent, rods at 85.2 percent, bars at 86.9
percent and tool steel, in all forms, 89.1 percent of capacity. Id. at Table B-16. Commissioner
Leonard restricted himself to finding that sheet and strip capacity utilization was at or below
50 percent for "most of the time period 1970-1974," but was higher in 1974 at 76 percent. Id. at
24. Minchew did not discuss capacity utilization for flat rolled products or plate and sheet and
strip separately. Id. at 35. Unemployment was covered by Commissioners Moore and Bedell
in a single sentence comparing the predepression year of 1975 with 1970. Id. at 11. Leonard
found that employment in the stainless sheet and strip industry was 57 percent lower in 1975
than in 1974, and below the 1970 figures. Id. at 25. Yet, a table compiled from responses to
the ITC questionnaire to producers showed employment in sheet and strip rising in every year
from 7,762 in 1970 to 11,700 in 1974 (Jan.-Sept.), and in plate from 1,555 (after drops in 1971
and 1972) to 2,378 in 1973 and 2,377 in 1974 (Jan.-Sept.). Id. at A-49. Man-hours for tool steel
workers increased steadily from 1971 through 1974. Id. at A-51. All commissioners finding
injury ignored this fact. Cf. SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at A-48-51. As for profits,
Commissioners Moore and Bedell found that throughout the period, profits were four percent
or less of sales, and that producers had sustained losses in sheet and strip, bar and rod, and
alloy tool steel. Id. at 11. Chairman Leonard found that net operating profits were less than
five percent of sales for sheet and strip in 1970 and 1972, and less than three percent in 1971.
Since this was a capital intensive industry, he concluded it must be in dire straits. Id. at B-45
(Table 45).
"-See SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at 25.
"
6See INDUSTRIAL FASTENERS, supra note 65, at 19.
"'See SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at 10.
ll8d. at A-56.
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supplies." 9 The Commission took note of this condition in the Industrial
Fasteners20 and the Gloves reports.' 2' Yet the specialty steel firms
reported capacity utiliztion in 1974 of only seventy-five percent in stainless
sheet, strip and plate. 22
There is nothing to indicate that the Commission explored the
foundation for the profit data more thoroughly than it did the capacity
submissions of the industry. Long experience in public utility regulation
should encourage caution in the acceptance of profit conclusions which
must be based upon a series of accounting assumptions about depreciation,
assignment of overhead and other highly judgmental decisions. In these
circumstances, the behavior of the firms would seem to be more significant
than their self-serving assertions of low profit rates. No companies had
exited from the specialty steel industry since 1968.123 Although the
Information stated that "[c]apital expenditures in recent years have been
limited"' 24 the Commission made no comparison of trends or proportions
in the industry's expenditures 25 with those of other industries to determine
whether they were unusually low. Annual expenditures hovered around
$51-57 million in 1971-1972, dropped to $3 million in 1973, rose to $81
million in 1974, and were budgeted at the same figure for 1975, and at $114
million for 1976.126 As a result of these expenditures, according to the
producers, productivity had increased by thirty-four percent between the
years 1971 and 1974, so that it is surely not correct, or at least it is a gross
oversimplification, to conclude as did Chairman Leonard that "needed
replacement of capital and expansion of facilities to produce for increased
demand and to achieve economies is made difficult if not impossible."' 28
The Central Analytical Problem of Injury Determination
Judgment of the analytical techniques used by the Commission to
determine the seriousness of injury is handicapped by the withholding of
information on the grounds of confidentiality of material. Nevertheless, it
is apparent that the limited availability of trained staff economists, the
shortness of time, statutory constraints, the indifference of the com-
119See INDUSTRIAL FASTENERS, supra note 66, at 58.
1201d.
121GLovEs, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 760, at 62 (March 1976) [hereinafter cited as GLOVES].
122SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at B-16.123See, e.g., AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE, DIRECTORY OF IRON AND STEEL WORKS
(1967); Petition of the Tool and Stainless Steel Industry Committee to the International Trade
Commission (July 16, 1975).
'24SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at 13.
12 5The industry obviously being the companies, not the various product lines.
126 SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at B-48 (Table 46).
12 71d. at 14 (prepared statement of Richard Simmons).
128Cf. id. at A-13-14: "[I]n recent years ... large gains have been made in productivity
through stepped-up cost-reduction programs, through efforts to improve yields, by reducing
energy costs wherever possible, by replacing old equipment, and by improving melting and
finishing equipment."
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missioners to inconsistencies in their positions in any given report, or
among reports, or a combination of all these elements, has led to
unsatisfactory results. Determinations of injury have frequently been made
on what appears to be a superficial basis.1 29
An allied deficiency is the Commission's failure to lay a solid
foundation for determination of the extent of injury in a context of
competitive market economics. Admittedly, the task of defining injury in
such a way as to satisfy the theory of competitive behavior while also
observing statutory standards poses a difficult problem for the Com-
mission. The theory of competition has not recently been directed toward
analysis of the way in which competitive behavior of firms and the
interactions produced by such behavior result in changes in the variables
normally given first priority by securities analysts, trade unions, or
management in evaluations of business strength. Perhaps this derives from
the disinterest of most economic theorists'3 0 in the details of cost and price
behavior and in short term reactions and in the range of phenomena that
can be so easily swept under the textbook rug by labelling them lags or
inelasticities. With the advent of more refined, rigorous and abstract
microeconomic theory, such homely concepts as "sick industry" and
"cutthroat competition" have been left to the intellectual sansculottes; and
the analysis of responses of one rival to another is left to elaborate
hypotheses based on the theory of games or decisionmaking under
conditions of uncertainity.13 1 Most of the industries that have petitioned for
import relief have been oligopolies, although some, like slide fasteners,
honey or footwear, appear to be workably competitive. 3 2 In either event,
there is no readily available analytical apparatus that will indicate the
likely sequence of steps or behavior pattern taken as a reaction to greater
intensity of competition, whether in the form of lower prices, quality
improvement or more attractive styling, except for.attempts to moderate the
force of the competition.
Conventional economics would regard the response of firms to com-
petitors as part of the competitive process, varying more or less with the
"19 The Information listed in the Iron Blue Pigment report showed four companies had
ceased to produce the iron blue pigment, but there was no discussion whatever in the
Information of the circumstances of their exit from the industry. IRON BLUE PIGMENT, supra
note 84, at A-14. Yet three had submitted written explanations. Id. at A-37.
ISOSee CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS (1961); Arndt, Power and
Competition, in MARKETS, CORPORATE BEHAVIOR AND THE STATE 39-43 (A. Jacquemin & H.
dejong eds. 1976); See also H. ARNDT, KAPITALISMUS, SOCIALISMUS: KONZENTRATION UND
KONKURRENZ 18-35 (1976).
3'5 See White, Industrial Organization and International Trade, 64 AM. EcoN. REV. 1013-
20 (1974).
ra2The plant hanger industry, for example, which seems to satisfy most tests of perfect
competition, was investigated at the Commission's own initiative. There were only twenty-
two firms making textile plant hangers, but every house plant lover is a potential
manufacturer of a macrame plant hanger; he or she is simply less likely to construct a
hanging planter.
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structure of the industry. If that competition forces some firms to shrink
their activities, reduce sales, cut investment or even exit, the industry, or at
least society, would not be injured but benefited. The very statutory criteria
for the Commission to take into consideration would not be regarded as
injury-certainly not the erasure of oligopolistic exploitation of customers.
Hence, if the Commission were to adopt standards close to those of
conventional micro-economics in reaching its findings about industry
injury, it might find itself restricted to conditions of unfair competition for
affirmative holdings of injury. There is no sign that the Commission has
attempted to distinguish between fair and unfair competition in examining
injury claims. There is a conflict between Congressional intent and
economic principle. The problem was discussed earlier in a review of the
dumping problem' 3 3-unffiir competition can injure an industry or a firm
in an economic sense because it can lead to a misallocation of resources
judged by conventional tests."34 On the other hand, competition which does
not rely on discriminatory prices by a firm with market power or which
does not employ other practices of a predatory nature will not injure the
firms who may find that they have lost customers. Even if the industry
disappears, it would not appear to have been injured as far as economic
analysis is concerned.
Nevertheless, a compromise position can perhaps be staked out. By
stimulating greater efficiency, innovativeness and agressiveness, competi-
tion may enable firms to survive in the long run. Serious injury to an
industry might be defined as responses to competition that are of such
intensity that the firms cannot recover, try as they may. Disappearance of
an industry rather than its reconstitution would be a serious injury. The
various criteria listed by the statute are the incentives that stimulate or force
the firms to mend their ways. That Congress could have had this
reasonable definition in mind is shown by the passage from the Senate
Finance Committee quoted earlier, 35 that ties relief specifically to a limited
time period within which the industry is supposed to ready itself to meet
the "new conditions of competition."' 3 6 The Commission is directed to
investigate and report on the "efforts made by firms and workers in the
industry to compete more effectively with imports." 3 7 This admonition, as
far as we can discover, has been observed in only the most perfunctory
fashion, although it is of key importance in appraising the seriousness of
injury. 38  It is significant also in evaluating the cause of the injury.
13sSee Adams & Dirlam, Dumping, Antitrust Policy, and Economic Power, Bus. Topics,
Spring, 1966 (Michigan State University).
13 1d. at 20-29.135See note 33 supra & text accompanying.136The Trade Act limits import relief to five years, and to the extent feasible, provides that
relief shall be phased down after three years. See 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(l)-(2) (Supp. V 1975).
13719 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(5) (Supp. V 1975).
138A self-inflicted injury cannot be permanent and is rarely mortal.
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Causal Relations Between Imports and Injury
Separating the injury definition from the cause of injury is not easy,
because as we have just seen,13 9 the injury can be regarded as an incentive to
the industry to improve its performance. If imports are associated with
more aggressive competition by domestic firms they may not, in some
circumstances, be regarded as the sole cause of injury to the domestic
industry. For instance, Commissioners Thunberg and Newsom, in their
Views on the piano industry, remarked:
The increased importance of imported pianos in apparent consumption in
recent years has provided part of the stimulation for a rationalization of
the domestic industry. New modern facilities have been constructed in
lower-cost locations; labor-saving equipment has been introduced in
various parts of the production process; shifts to lower-cost sources of
supply abroad are being implemented. 40
In the Slide Fastener Information, we learn that increased imports
had caused the domestic industry to "increase discounts from standard
price lists, to develop new producers, and to improve production-line
efficiencies."' 4' None of the Commissioners, even those who found that
imports had not been a substantial cause of serious injury, alluded in their
views to these beneficial effects of imports.
Apart from the possibility that imports may seem to contribute to the
health rather than weakness of a domestic industry, the charge to the
Commission poses one of the most difficult problems of economics, that of
tracing and assessing causal relationships. One need only refer to the
great debate over inflation to see how little has been accomplished at the
aggregative level to disentangle the variables. Yet the Commission, like its
predecessors, must not only report to the President on whether imports
have caused injury, but on the extent to which the phenomena representing
injury are attributable to imports. With each successive revision of the
escape clause, the degree of responsibility that calls forth remedial action
has been altered. Initially, in interpreting the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, the Commission took the view that in finding imports to be a "major
cause" of injury, effects of imports had to be more important than all other
causes combined. In 1969, however, "major cause" was held to be a
residual; this was the Tariff Commission's "but for" interpretation. If
imports were the final straw that broke the camel's back, they would
constitute a "major cause." 142
Even with the "but for" or "last straw" approach, it was still
possible for commissioners to reach diametrically opposed conclusions
about the importance of imports.143 In most reports the Commission failed
"
59See notes 136-137 supra & text accompanying.
'
40PIANOS, supra note 96, at 3.
'
41SLiDE FASTENERS, supra note 67, at A-47.
'
42See Hardship, supra note 14, at 795-97.
143In the Flat Glass and TeMpered Glass report, for instance, Commissioners Bedell,
Sutton and Moore found that imports of sheet glass were the major competitive factor
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to find that imports had been a major factor in injury of domestic firms.
According to Fulda, writing in 1972:
[T]he Commission has done a creditable job in determining whether
increased imports have or have not been the major cause of serious injury
or threat of such injury.... In numerous denials the Commission has
convincingly explained that the injury or unemployment was due to
inability to compete with domestic rivals, corporate reorganization,
recession, inflation, and other causes. 44
Hence, in revising the injury standard in the Trade Act of 1974,145
Congress assumed that to require the Commission to find that imports
were a substantial cause, rather than a major cause, would make it easier
for petitioners to obtain relief.
In none of the cases decided under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
had the Commission attempted a quantitative approach to measuring the
relative importance of the causal factors that could have resulted in injury.
Perhaps detailed inquiry was unnecessary when, by qualitative appraisal,
the Commission could conclude that imports, although important, were
not the major cause of injury. In any event, the Congressional history of
the Trade Act of 1974 gives some indication of the type of inquiry the
Commission should make to determine substantiality. The House com-
mittee stressed the necessity for the Commission's application of two tests:
one of importance, the other of weight compared with other causes. 146
Imports cannot be equally important as all other causes, if there are a
number of causes, because then none would be important. The Senate
committee expressly granted license to the Commission to use its intuition:
"The Committee recognizes that 'weighing' causes in a dynamic economy is
not always possible. It is not intended that a mathematical test be applied
by the Commission.'47
Under the Trade Act of 1974, therefore, the Commission has been
charged with conducting a more detailed and precise inquiry into cause of
injury than under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. If there is more than
one cause of injury, then imports must be more important than at least one
other cause to constitute a substantial cause.148
Oligopolistic price setting, recession, poor management, change in
consumers' tastes, if all present simultaneoulsy must, or at least should be
threatening domestic producers of sheet glass, even though "sheet faces market pressure from
float glass in part of its market." FLAT GLASS & TEMPERED GLASS, T.C. PUB. No. 459, at 13
(Jan. 1972). Commissioners Parker and Young found that regardless of imports there had
been a major shift to float glass, which had almost completely displaced sheet in the
automotive market, and that it would make inroads in other markets.
14Hardship, supra note 14, at 26-27.
14519 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
1
46
HousE REPORT, supra note 32, at 46.
147S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 120-21 (1974).
'"8See 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975). "[S]ubstantial cause means a cause which is
important and not less than any other cause." Id.
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evaluated in order to rank imports properly. Under the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 it was necessary only to determine whether imports resulting
from trade agreement concessions were the major factor, that is, more
important than all other factors. If they were, such a finding would
dispose of the matter without bothering either to compare imports with
each of the other influences, or to determine whether they were sufficiently
numerous to render each unimportant.1 49
In determining whether imports are a substantial cause, the Com-
mission has generally respected faithfully the Senate committee's admoni-
tion to abjure mathematical precision. In the Gloves report, however, the
Commission relied on a regression analysis of demand to dismiss a threat of
serious injury.15 0 In the Flatware case, the Commission staff apparently
carried out a correlation analysis, not presented in detail, that showed no
relation between profits and imports, but this was not mentioned in any of
the commissioners' views. In the Industrial Fasteners report, the Informa-
tion found demand "correlated" with industrial production of durable
goods, again without mentioning details of the study supporting the
statement.15'
When the commissioners attempt to weigh the relative effect of imports,
as against other causes of injury, by qualitative methods, inconsistencies
appear from report to report. In the Slide Fasteners case, for instance,
Commissioners Leonard and Bedell took account of the effect of changes in
style and of the recession on the profitability of the zipper industry. Since
the "decline in apparent consumption was more rapid than the decline in
imports, there were marginal increases in the ratio of imports to consump-
"
9See discussion in the text accompanying notes 141-148 supra.
'
50With imports as a dependent variable and domestic prices, the industrial production
index, and shipments to inventories ratio as a measure of capacity as independent variables,
imports were shown to respond to higher prices and to rises in the industrial production
index. See GLOVES, supra note 121, at 12-13. "The 'centerpiece' of these regressions is the
significant and pervasive influence of the overall pace of industrial activity on the demand for
imports of all types of gloves ... except for the rubber and plastic types." Id. at A-64. The latter
exercised the most important influence. If imports tended to increase when the economy
expanded, then it could be concluded that there was no threat of serious injury.
15iSee INDUSTMIAL FASTENERS, supra note 66, at A-57. The ITC staff estimated the price
elasticity of demand for imported honey and also computed a large number (82) of simple
correlation analyses between such variables as number of bee colonies, pesticide applications,
hay acreage and pounds per colony. There was no attempt, however, to duplicate the
Industrial Fastener multiple regression approach and isolate the determinants of honey
imports. HONEY, U.S.I.T.C. PuB. No. 781, at A-137-40 (June 1976) [hereinafter cited as HONEY].
No reference to the studies appear in the Commissioners' views.
When the domestic market for mushrooms was devastated by the discovery of botulism,
the Commission was faced with the problem of weighing the relative influence of imports of
canned mushrooms, the public's fear of possible contamination and a shortage of fresh
mushrooms available to canners. The Staff apparently attempted no regression analysis,
confining its analysis of causation to a simple review of consumption trends and relative
prices of canned and imported mushrooms. See MusHRooMs, U.S.I.T.C. Pus. No. 761, at lA-62-
87 (March 1976). The descriptive approach was followed in the second mushroom case. See
MUSHROOMS, supra note 65, at A-63, A-89.
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tion."15 2 But in the Specialty Steel case, Chairman Leonard compared a
drastic drop in consumption of sheet and strip (317,000 tons) with a small
increase in imports (11,000) to draw the conclusion that imports were a
substantial cause of injury to the stainless sheet and strip industry. 53
The Footwear 54 case illustrates the pitfalls of analyzing cause without
resort to rigorous quantitative procedures. The recession and changes in
styles were listed as causes of injury to the domestic industry, accounting in
part for a decline in consumption. Imports were nevertheless held to be a
substantial cause.' 55
Large shoe manufacturing firms had apparently withstood the import
attack; perhaps the small firms were merely inefficient. No financial data
were available for the small firms; their proprietors may have been taking
large salaries in lieu of dividends. 156  According to the retailers, the
American manufacturers were simply unable to supply the shoes that were
in greatest demand, and Chairman Leonard in effect conceded this point by
saying that while United States domestic manufacturers were capable of
producing currently popular styles, they could not do so economically. 57
Whether the domestic industry could have attracted customers for these
styles at significantly higher prices was not explored, although one
Commissioner was sure that price was the primary consideration in
inducing the retailers to feature foreign rather than domestic models. 58
'
52SLIDE FASTENERS, supra note 66.
'
53Actually, Leonard stated that the market "decreased by almost one-half, while imports
increased by more than 10,000 tons." See SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at 26. Cf. id. Table 3,
Appendix B, at 4.
1 5
'
4FOOTWEAR 1976, supra note 66; see also FOOTWEAR 1977, supra note 67.
155See FOOTWEAR 1976, supra note 65, at 18-19 (views of Minchew & Parker), 56 (views of
Moore). The report reviewed various considerations which might show the influence of
imports on the domestic industry, but did not attempt to clarify relative importance
of each by use of refined statistical procedures. See id. at A-139-59 (Information). In
the second investigation of the shoe industry conducted under the Trade Act of 1974, the
Commissioners adhered to the same position as that which they had adopted in the first, and
the staff did no more than review import penetration ratios and broad price classes in
discussing the substantiality of imports as a cause of injury. See FOOTWEAR 1977, supra note
67, at 7-54 (views of Commissioners), A-90-105 (Information).
156REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON NONRUBBER FOOTWEAR 23-25 (1970)
(Table 16); see note 105 supra. Commissioner Ablondi has emphasized that large firms are
able to cope with imports, and in fact, may be responsible in part for the difficulties of the
smaller shoe manufacturers. "The largest producers will continue to compete successfully
against imports while the rest of the industry deteriorates under the pressure of competition
both from imports and from dominant firms." FOOTWEAR 1977, supra note 67, at 41-45. The
analysis of the domestic market in the Information is not sufficiently detailed to determine
whether or not the small firms suffer from competition by the large ones, although its data
show that the industry is "heavily concentrated," and that there has been "an evident increase
in the concentration of retail outlets for footwear owned by the major firms." FOOTWEAR 1976,
supra note 66, at A-63-64. For the 1977 report, the Commission merely updated the leading
features of its 1976 report.
157FoOTWEAR 1976, supra note 66, at 42.
'
581d. at 63.
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In attributing domestic injury to imports, the commissioners have
sometimes stressed lower prices of imports. 5 9 In weighing the role of price,
its influence cannot be easily separated from import penetration, which
itself is a prerequisite to any finding that import relief is needed. If
imports are nbt easily distinguishable as more desirable than the domestic
product for stylistic or other reasons, or if there is no excess of demand over
current domestic supply at prevailing prices, there must be a differential or
discount of import below domestic price to conspensate for the annoyance,
hazard, delay, additional capital commitment and other costs of depending
upon a supplier in another country. To some extent these advantages can
be overcome by foreigners establishing their own distribution centers in the
United States, as Swedish and Belgian specialty and carbon steel producers
have done. Nevertheless, it would be unusual if imports did not sell for less
than similar domestic products at the wholesale level to industrial
customers. In petitioning for relief, the domestic industry frequently, if not
always, calls attention to the low price of imports as though the lower price
were in itself a demonstration of serious injury. 60 Metzger's comment on
domestic producers, particularly those organized as oligopolies, seems at
least partly justified; they "generally have an idea of the maximum price
cut they would be prepared to make"-that is, the fraction of the value
added they are prepared to forego.' 6'
In evaluating the relative importance of a recession and of imports in
reducing sales, cutting profits or employment, or raising inventories, the
Commission confronts a set of dynamic variables where the separation of
causes is difficult. A simple approach would compare the decline in
shipments or consumption with the change in imports, from a period of
prosperity or peak activity to the recession or depression. If the decline is
in excess of the increase in imports, or if imports have also fallen, then it
might be concluded that imports have been less important than a change in
159Those commissioners who found injury in the Industrial Fasteners report alluded to
lower import price, INDUSTRIAL FASTENERS, supra note 66, at 3, and Moore and Bedell referred
to "price pressure" of imports of stainless steel in 1970-1973, and in late 1974-1975. SPECIALTY
STEEL, supra note 52, at 12. Prices were said to be the connecting link between imports of iron
blue pigments and injury. IRON BLUE PIGMENTS, supra note 84, at 7. In HONEY, supra note
151, the majority, because of a high lagged correlation between import prices and domestic
prices, concluded that the former would continue to exercise a depressing influence. Id. at 11-
12. The minority found domestic prices for the last available month higher than for any of
the preceding seven months. Id. at 24. Responses to the ITC questionnaire are at variance
with the Department of Agriculture price series. See id. at A-104, 112 (Table 31). On the other
hand, in the Mushroom report, Commissioner Moore called attention to the fact that import
prices for a No. 10 can of mushrooms, an important item in the institutional market, were
higher than domestic prices. MUSHROOMS, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 761, at 45 (March 1976).
160Testimony of Richard Simmons: "[F]oreign producers cut their prices in the period of
1969 through 1972, in order to capture the market, and then sold at a premium when the
demand was high during 1973 and 1974, and then, drastically reduced their quotations as soon
as the market declined in 1975." Investigation No. TA-201-5, Hearings on Stainless Steel and
Alloy Tool Steel and Silicon Steel 68 (Oct. 1975).
'61Adjustment Assistance, supra note 14, at 177.
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business conditions in causing the injury. Yet it is easy to conceive of a
case where domestic shipments might decline sufficiently to leave imports,
even though unchanged or decreased, preempting a larger share of the
market. An extreme example might leave imports with 100 percent of the
market, though unchanged in volume.
The Commission has attempted to cope with this ambiguity by relying
upon penetration ratios.1 62 If the share of the domestic market held by
imports rises, then this can be taken as evidence of injury, even though the
absolute level of imports remains the same or falls. To resolve the problem
logically, however, it is desirable to avoid the "but for" or marginal
approach. True, if imports were eliminated, the domestic producers might
find themselves with 100 percent of the business at the trough of a
depression. Yet the overwhelming share of their loss of business, and
consequent decline in employment, would be attributable to a change in
business conditions, not the imports. This would be true even if imports
had held a large share of the market prior to the reversal in economic
activity.
A similar approach could be employed in assessing the relative impact
of a change in taste which seems to have diminished the demand for
asparagus, 63 or the decline in consumer interest in large cigars which
shrank the market for Connecticut and Florida shade tobacco. 64 The
reluctance of consumers to purchase canned mushrooms following the
botulism toxin scare of 1973 provides another example of a decrease in
consumption that might acount for a rise in the penetration ratio of
imports.165
When commissioners have taken the point of view that these long or
short term trends can intensify vulnerability to imports, they have not
carefully explained how the ranking, or substantiality, of the cause may be
altered. For instance, in the Birch Doorskin report, Commissioner Min-
chew found that Quimby, the major domestic producer, was more sensitive
to imports because the product's sales moved with variations in the level of
1
62To be sure, the statute directs the Commission to take into account "with respect to
substantial cause," an increase in either relative or actual imports and a decline in the
proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic producers. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(C)
(Supp. V 1975). But nowhere does either the statute or legislative history suggest that these
indicia by themselves are determinative of substantiality; rather they should be prerequisites
for moving to a more profound analysis of the role of imports in causing such injury as may
have occurred.
163See ASPARAGUS, supra note 72, at A-110.
164The marked decline in U.S. consumers' taste for large cigars was a more important
cause of injury to the domestic industry than imports. See WRAPPER TOBACCO, U.S.I.T.C.
PUB. No. 746, at 12, 14 (Nov. 1975). The piano industry was also affected by changes in
consumption habits reflecting urbanization, mobility, television, ownership, etc., leading to
declining per capita consumption. See PIANOS, supra note 96, at 13.
165See MUSHROOMS, supra note 65, at 33, 42 (views of Minchew g& Moore). But see id. at 14
(views of Leonard).
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housing starts. 66 And in the Specialty Steel report, Chairman Leonard
found that the cyclical nature of the industry made.imports even more
important as a cause of injury. 167 If this observation can be generalized, it
suggests that an industry which goes through cycles which are generally
more extreme than the economy as a whole, such as capital goods or
durable goods industries, will be more likely to be injured by imports. But
the proposition is still left obscure. Does it really mean more than that,
with a given level of imports, the percentage of penetration will be higher
in a recession if the industry is subject to wide cyclical swings? Moreover,
in the Stainless Steel Wire case, just the contrary conclusion was reached on
the basis of the exceptional cyclical variation of the domestic shipments. 68
To rely on changes in import penetration ratios to show substantiality
of cause as an industry moves from prosperity to recession would require
the Commission to recommend relief measures that would necessarily vary
from recession to prosperity; quotas or tariff increases imposed because of
the 1974-1975 recession would have to be eliminated as soon as the
economy revived. Moreover, there would still be no demonstration that, as
a separate cause, imports had been more important than the normal
cyclical downturn. The point is especially important for industries such as
specialty steel and stainless wire, as well as industrial fasteners.
69
Conclusions on Causal Relations
In being expressly charged with finding whether or not an economic
variable does or does not have influence on another variable, and, in
addition, being required to measure with a fair degree of precision, the
magnitude of effect of that variable, the Commission is exceptional among
American judicial administrative and fact finding bodies. Juries and courts,
to be sure, are faced with making decisions about causality, responsibility
and damages in tort cases, but they can rely on numerous precedents in
reaching their conclusions. Moreover they are concerned with the past.
Regulatory commissions must arrive at estimates of a fair return which is
sufficient to attract the necessary capital to a public utility, but not so high
as to overcompensate stockholders. To be sure they forecast, and are
required to make rather simple estimates of causality, by arriving at a
revenue figure that will produce the fair return. Their decisions also are in
166BIRCH PLYWOOD, supra note 77, at 29.
167SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at 26.
168RoUND STAINLESS STEEL WIRE, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 779, at 7-9 (June 1976) (views of
Leonard & Minchew); id. at 15 (views of Bedell).
169Here, as elsewhere, the Commission (like its predecessor, the United States Tariff
Commission) has failed to develop a consistent, well-grounded core of policies. This may be
attributable to the fact that, except for determinations under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), its decisions are deemed to constitute merely findings transmitted to
the President rather than "orders," license grants or license denials, and hence are immune
from judicial review and are outside the scope of the Administrative Procedures Act.
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the mainstream of a long line of inquiries of more or less similar character
with the basic elements of the estimate always the same: existing revenue,
net earnings and known prices of securities and capital structure. Failure to
make an accurate prediction of change in revenue necessary to produce the
desired rate of return can always be remedied. And it is the regulated
company that charges and receives the price. The International Trade
Commission, obviously, faces many more industrial problems, and it must
take into account micro and macro-economic variables whose significance
differs for each industry. What is more, the Commission must forecast the
future of industries which are not legal monopolies.
REMEDIES AND RELIEF
After reaching an affirmative decision, the Commission must take one
further step in recommending relief to the President. In its infinite wisdom,
Congress has kept the membership of the Commission at six, so that from
time to time it divides equally; a deadlock is also possible when only four
commissioners participate in a case. In the Asparagus report, for example,
three commissioners voted in the affirmative, three in the negative. The
Tariff Act of 1930 provides that when there is equally divided Commission,
the findings of either group may be considered by the President as the
findings of the Commission. 70 The Trade Act of 1974, however, states that
if the Commission finds serious injury from imports, it shall transmit its
recommendations to the President.' 7' With an equally divided Commission
no recommendations can be made that can qualify as those of the
Commission, although those of individual commissioners may be trans-
mitted to the President for his information.
The Trade Act of 1974, however, does not insure that, even in those
cases where a majority of the Commission finds there has been injury, there
will be a unanimous recommendation for relief. If there is equal division
between two possible measures of relief, or if, with five voting, two
commissioners hold there has been no injury, and each of three consti-
tuting a majority affirmative vote recommend a different relief, then the
President will have no authoritative recommendation on his desk. Commis-
sioner Minchew has therefore taken the position that even when he has
voted negatively on injury, he will vote for relief if the majority of the
Commission finds imports have been a substantial cause of serious
injury. 172
17019 U.S.C. § 1330(d)(1) (1970).
17119 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
172See Additional View of Vice-Chairman Minchew with regard to recommendations of
remedy in ASPARAGUS, supra note 72, at 20-24. Under Pub. L. No. 94-455 § 1801, 90 Stat.
1763 (1976), the President is given formal authority to consider as the "determination of the
Commission" either a negative or affirmative finding when the Commission is equally
divided as to the existence of serious injury. As for remedy, if a majority can not agree, even
[Vol. 52:535
IMPORT COMPETITION
Import Relief: Presidential Response to ITC Recommendations
The Trade Act of 1974 provides for import relief in cases of serious
injury to a domestic industry. 73 Yet the determination of the exact terms of
the relief depends on the President after he reviews the ITC's recom-
mendations. 74 And the President may be overruled by Congress, should
he differ from the Commission. 75  Although Congress has not as
yet attempted to impose the Commission's original recommendation, the
possibility is real. 76 Ambiguities are latent in the statute. Could Congress
pass a resolution disapproving the action of the President if he proclaims
stricter control of imports than that adopted by the ITC? It appears that
the legislative purpose in allowing Congress final say was to permit the
Commission's recommendations to be enforced if they are watered down in
any way by the President.
Directives to the President are more explicit than those that guide the
Commission's actions with regard to import relief. In case of an affirmative
finding, the President may increase or impose a duty or a tariff-rate quota,
impose or modify a quota, negotiate an "orderly marketing agreement"
with foreign countries or combine all of these. 77 From the statute it is not
clear whether the Commission may recommend an orderly marketing
agreement. Because the Commission is not empowered to negotiate such an
agreement, and hence cannot specify its terms, the statutory omission seems
though there has been an affirmative decision, then a "plurality of not less than three
commissioners" shall be treated as a remedial finding. Finally, if there are two groups, each
with three members, agreeing on different remedies, the President may choose either one. But
in that case, or when he chooses a remedy different from either, Congress may pick its own
remedy as a basis for overriding the President as long as it is supported by three
commissioners. This amendment has not yet been put to the test. IL may lead some
commissioners to join with others in favoring a remedy in order to arrive at a statutory
"remedy determination" when they would not otherwise have been willing to do so. Thus,
Chairman Minchew joined with Commissioners Parker and Moore to approve increased
duties on mushrooms, although he found imports were not a substantial cause of injury. See
MUSHROOMS, supra note 65, at 3, 33.
17319 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (Supp. V 1975).
174See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2253 (Supp. V 1975).
17519 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
176A House Concurrent Resolution was introduced on January 24, 1977 to disapprove the
determination of the President not to provide import relief for the honey industry. A hearing
was held, at which the Administration witnesses listed the types of aid given to beekeepers,
such as compensation for pesticide-caused losses, research on the importance of pollination
services and the price-support program for honey. Import Relief to the Domestic Honey
Industry Hearings on H. Con. Res. 80 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways
and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-11(1977). The Committee on Ways and Means reported
unfavorably. It found that (1) imports tend to increase when domestic production is
insufficient to satisfy 1he stable honey demand, (2) imports had slowed down since the
President's decision, (3) commercial producers operated profitably, and (4) there was no
evidence of idling of capacity or declining employment. The imposition of import restraints
might have an adverse effect on negotiations in Geneva. See H.R. REP. No. 95-25, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977).
17719 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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intentional. Indeed, in none of the reports so far transmitted to the
President has the Commission proposed an orderly marketing agreement as
relief. The Act does not define an orderly marketing agreement, although
Title I, dealing with negotiating authority, gives the President authority to
try to establish within the GATT "an [sic] international agreements on
articles (including footwear), including... a surveillance body to monitor
all international shipments . 7.8.."1t8
In spite of the failure of the escape clause to spell out the types of
recommendations the Commission may adopt, it is likely that they include
all those listed as being available for selection by the President. And the
Commission has gone ahead to recommend, as shown in Table 4, infra,
tariff rate quotas, 17 9 higher duties,8 0 quotas' 8' and adjustment assistance. 18 2
As pointed out above, the procedural looseness under which the Commis-
sion operates permits an affirmative finding of injury by a majority of the
Commission without insuring that there will be a majority recommenda-
tion for a specific form of relief. In such circumstances, the President,
without fear of Congressional override, can determine that no relief
whatever is necessary. Nevertheless, in several reports, the Commission has
transmitted more than one recommendation to the President. 183
The President's freedom to choose relief procedures or to substitute
adjustment assistance for other types of relief has been reduced by the 1976
17819 U.S.C. § 2131(a)(12) (Supp. V 1975). "Orderly" marketing arrangements have been
devised to deal with "market disruption" under the G.A.T.T. Neither term appears in the
G.A.T.T., but as early as 1959, "market disruption" was placed on the Contracting Parties'
agenda at the initiative of the United States. They subsequently agreed on a definition and
established a Working Party on Evidence of Market Disruption. In 1962 the Long-Term
Arrangement for Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles was negotiated and was
renegotiated in 1974. K. DAM, supra note 8, ch. 17; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
ARRANGEMENT REGARDING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TEXTILES (1974).179See SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at 17.
'
80See IRON BLUE PIGMENTS, supra note 84, at 3.
181See SPECIALTY STEEL, supra note 52, at 4-5.
182See SHRIMP, supra note 64.
'
83For instance in the Flatware case, three commissioners recommended a tariff-rate
quota at higher rates for excess imports, one commissioner recommended continuation for a
new five-year period of the tariff rate quota about to expire and two commissioners
recommended adjustment assistance. See STAINLESS FLATWARE, supra note 68, at 5-6.
Commissioners Minchew, Leonard and Moore recommended higher duties on television
receivers, Commissioners Parker and Bedell recommended the same level of duties on color
television receivers only, and Commissioner Ablondi recommended quotas on color receivers.
See TELEVISION RECEIVERS, supra note 19, at 4-5. Under the 1976 amendments to the Trade
Act, the recommendation by Commissioners Minchew, Leonard and Moore constitutes the
recommendation of the Commission. See note 172 supra. There was a similar plurality of three
recommending tariff rate quotas with an increase in duty on canned mushrooms. This
recommendation will now constitute the recommendation of the Commission. See MusH-
ROOMS, supra note 65, at 3-4. The plurality was obtained, however, with the vote of
Commissioner Minchew, who concluded that imports were not a substantial cause of injury
and hence voted in the negative. The President determined that relief was not in the national
interest. See Memorandum of March 19, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,801 (1977). See Table 4 infra.
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amendment. In .the four reports with affirmative findings since the
amendment, a plurality of three commissioners has been obtained for a
single recommendation.'84 Nevertheless, the Act provides a much broader
framework for Presidential appraisal of the terms of relief than that which
guides the Commission. Broadly, the relief determined by the President
should "facilitate the orderly adjustment to new competitive conditions by
the industry in question.' t85  More specifically, the President, before
deciding whether to provide import relief and in selecting which type of
relief to be enacted, is required to take into account the following factors:
1. The extent to which workers are getting adjustment assistance.
2. The extent to which firms in the industry are or are not likely to
receive adjustment assistance,
3. The probable effectiveness of the relief "as a means to promote
adjustment,"
4. The efforts being made or to be implemented by the industry to
adjust to import competition,
5. The position of the industry in the nation's economy,
6. The effect of import relief on consumers,
7. The effect of import relief on competition in the domestic markets,
8. The effect on the international economic interests of the U.S.,
9. The impact on U.S. industries and firms of possible modification
of duties or other import restrictions resulting from international obliga-
tion with respect to compensation, 8
6
10. The geographic concentration of imported products marketed in
the U.S.,
11. The extent to which the U.S. is the focal point for exports because
of restraints on exports to third country markets, and
181See TELEVISION RECEIVERS, supra note 19; SUGAR, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 807 (March
1977); FOOTWEAR 1977, supra note 67; MUSHROOMS, supra note 65.
18519 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (Supp. V 1975). This phrase may also be read as suggesting that if
import injury is to be found by the ITC, it should derive from some recent shift in relative
efficiency or pricing policy; it could not, as the specialty steel industry argued, be the result of
a "cumulative" impact of imports over a long period.
186This provision is to be read in conjunction with section 3 of Article XIX of the GATT
which permits retaliation by the country or countries subjected to the imposition of new
restraints on their exports or compensatory action to reduce tariffs or quotas on other articles
under section 2 of Article XXVIII. Presumably the exporting country would have to agree to
the "reshuffling." See K. DAM, supra note 8, at 85. In 1977, Commissioner Leonard began to
list dutiable imports from, and U.S. exports to, those countries which would be most affected
by his relief recommendations. See, e.g., FOOTWEAR 1977, supra note 67, at 32-37; TELEVISION
RECEIVERS, supra note 19, at 32-36. He did not reach any conclusions about the feasibility or
desirability of U.S. concessions, nor suggest which imports should be singled out for
liberalization. Neither did he hazard a forecast of which U.S. industries would be most likely
to suffer from retaliation. Presumably his data were designed to aid the President in weighing
benefits to the injured industry against harm to other industries that would follow from
adopting the recommendations.
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12. The economic and social costs incurred by taxpayers, communi-
ties and workers if import relief were or were not provided. 87
The recital of these points should be sufficient to show that the
President may, if he so chooses, conduct an inquiry much more profound
and, at the same time, more sensitive than that of the Commission. In his
inquiry he is free to call on the International Trade Commission for
additional information. Presumably he may also obtain information from
other sources. Interested parties do not hesitate to apply pressure to and
argue their cause with the Special Trade Representative for Trade
Negotiators, and even, it seems, by direct contact with the President. 88 The
considerations listed are so comprehensive there is wide latitude for
justifying a refusal to grant import relief; simple inspection of these points
indicates that the President has a number of escape hatches available.
In the memoranda embodying his decision, the President has usually
been quite brief. 89 Table 4, infra, summarizes Presidential statements
regarding the twelve cases where import relief was recommended by the
Commission, and on which the President had acted through June 1, 1977.
In the Specialty Steel case, the President proposed to substitute an orderly
marketing agreement for the quotas recommended by the ITC. The quota
remedy was "too inflexible in view of the rapid expansions and contrac-
tions of the specialty steel market. During a recession period, imports
would not be sufficiently constrained to prevent a recurrence of the
187See generally 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (Supp. V 1975). This list of "considerations" has
been slightly rephrased.
18 "[T]he real place where the policy decision was made was after the ITC case,"
says Mr. deKieffer [Attorney for the petitioners].
There was no letdown on the part of the companies or the union. "We did
generate a lot of support on the part of the rank and file," recalls Ray Pasnick
[director of public relations for the Steelworkers]. "We sent bus loads of people
down to buttonhole Congressmen." In their educational effort, the specialty people
touched all bases.
"They talked to everybody in the Administration," say Mr. deKieffer. "There
was a lot of work on the Hill."
The White House was among the places visited. "I.W. Abel and I met with the
President," say Mr. Simmons. "All we did was present the facts. He made no
commitments." It is not irrelevant that Mr. Ford's announcement was made on
June 7 at Middletown, Ohio, base of Armco Steel Corp. The President was
campaigning in the Ohio primaries at the time. For the specialty producers, it was
probably fortunate that their fate was decided at a time of acute political sensitivity.
McManus,. 11hy Specialty Steel Won Its Case for Quotas, IRON AGE, July 19, 1976, at 22-25.
'89For instance, in determining that import relief should not be accorded the footwear
industry, the President sent to Congress a one and a half page report. ADJUSTMENT ASSiSTANCE
FOR U.S. FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY, H.R. Doc. No. 94-458, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). This action
is required under 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975) when the President determines that in
the national interest, relief should not be provided. In transmitting his report rejecting
import assistance for honey, the President took the position that 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (Supp.
V 1975), which purports to give Congress the power to override his decision not to grant relief,
is unconstitutional. See 41 Fed. Reg. 36,788 (1976). The President rejected the Commission's
recommendation for tariff rate quotas on canned mushrooms with less than a page of
explanation. See 42 Fed. Reg. 13,801 (1977).
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problems encountered last year."1 0  Yet in a period of peak demand
"imports could be held below levels needed by domestic consumers
.... ,191 Oddly enough, in the quotas he finally imposed, the President
made no provision for cyclical adjustments. 92 In deciding to negotiate for
an orderly marketing agreement, the President took note of the report of a
task force, at cabinet level, chaired by the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, although the statute does not expressly provide for such a
body to advise in section 201 cases. 93
In rejecting all of the 1976 relief proposals of the ITC for footwear, the
Commission being unable to muster up a majority for any one plan, the
President listed as reasons for preferring adjustment assistance: (1) Import
relief, according to the ITC report, would not be an effective remedy for
smaller firms; (2) Import relief would disproportionately benefit the 21
largest firms producing 50 percent of domestic output; (3) The industry was
recovering from the recession; (4) Adjustment assistance would be more
consistent with an anti-inflationary program; (5) There would have to be
compensatory reduction in tariffs on other U.S. imports, or the U.S. would
suffer retaliation; and (6) Adjustment assistance would not distort existing
trade relationships whereas import relief would.194
In the 1977 sequel to the 1976 refusal to impose import restraints, the
President attempted to arrive at orderly marketing arrangements with
Taiwan and Korea to limit shipments of footwear to the United States. 95
Recently, some commissioners have seemed to adopt Presidential criteria in
deciding on relief measures. According to Commissioner Leonard,
neither his proposed relief of an increase in duties by 200 percent nor the
majority's recommendation for tariff-rate quotas, with duties 300 percent
higher for two years on imports above the quota, would have materially
reduced either the level of consumption or decreased imports below 1976
levels. 196 He estimated that the cost to the consumer of his relief proposal
19°MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SPECIALTY STEEL IMPORT RELIEF
ACTION 4 (March 16, 1976).
19 11d. at 4.
19 2See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, PRESS RELEASE
No. 229 (Jung 11, 1976).
1931t was reported that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of State were
opposed to the quota recommendations of the ITC. See Steel Imports Plan Hit by Task Force,
Wash. Post, March 4, 1976, at 1. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, however, does provide for
an advisory committee, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970).
"
4 ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR THE U.S. FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY, H.R. Doc. No. 94-458, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
19'See Wall St. J., April 4, 1977, at 5.
19tSee FOOTWEAR 1977, supra note 67, at 30. Chairman Leonard's conclusion depended
on a number of assumptions about trends in imports and domestic production cross-elasticity
in demand between imported and domestic shoes, the forward shifting of duties to retail prices
and excess capacity in domestic manufacture, none of which was supported by reference to under-
lying calculations or data.See FOOTwEAR 1977. supra note 67, at 24, 29 nn. 1-2. It is impossible to
check Leonard's estimate. Nowhere in the Information, embracing 100 pages of text, 5 pages
of charts and 63 pages of tables may be found a single reference to demand elasticity, the price
1977]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
would be $340 million in the first year, compared with $1.5 billion for the
quota proposed by the manufacturers and the union.1 97 Again, when the
Commission dealt with the color television receiver industry, in supporting
their recommendation of a twenty percent duty as against the present rate
of five percent ad valorem, the Commission majority estimated that the
retail price of color sets would rise $35.198
In another instance, the President pointed out not only that under
GATT, the United States would have to take compensatory, or suffer
retaliatory action but that three economic arguments justified his refusal to
approve the tariff rate increases recommended by the Commission: 99 (1)
Imports had declined since 1973, when they accommodated a peak domestic
demand;200 (2) Prices had gone up, and import relief by tariff increases
would raise them further; and (3) The two large firms producing the
American pigments could easily finance any investment necessary to
impose their competitive position. 20 '
In sum, the President seems to have used his powers to moderate severe
recommendations made by the Commission for import relief. In most
instances, he has opted for adjustment assistance. On the other hand, in
the one instance where he has used his powers to impose quotas, the
volume of imports was larger than in any other investigation except
footwear. It will therefore repay examination to determine the relative
severity of the quotas finally imposed in the Specialty Steel case.
Of the countries with which the Special Trade Representative tried to
negotiate orderly marketing arrangements on specialty steel, only Japan
was cooperative.20 2 The President was obliged, therefore, when his time
effect of a tariff or quota or the cost to consumers of alternative relief measures. A staff
economist, however, Wayne Simon, prepared a study of the demand for imports. See OFFICE
OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH OF THE USITC, IMPORT ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR THE NONRUBBER
FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY (Dec. 1976) (processed). This report was used to calculate the
consequences of different forms of relief. The import elasticity of -1.33 was expressed in terms
of the relative price of imports to domestically produced shoes, and as used by Chairman
Leonard, assumed no rise in prices of domestically manufactured shoes.
197 FOOTWEAR 1977, supra note 67, at 29. Chairman Leonard assumes his proposed tariff
would increase imported shoe prices by $.87 per pair. No supporting analysis is provided.
198See TELEVISION RECEIVERS, supra note 183, at 22-23. Again, the conclusion depends on
the marshalling of assumptions about prices and margins that cannot be checked, and are not
even discussed elsewhere in the report.
'99See Determination under § 202(a) of the Trade Act, Iron Blue Pigments, 41 Fed. Reg.
22,331 (1976).20 This is an interesting point because the President here challenged the Commission's
own fact finding on its most important ground-the prerequisite for an affirmative decision
that there be an increase in imports. In effect, he took as his own the views of Commissioner
Ablondi, who alluded to the forty percent drop in imports since 1974. See IRON BLUE
PIGMENTS, supra note 84, at 29.
'-"Determination under § 202(a) of the Trade Act, Iron Blue Pigments, 41 Fed. Reg.
22,331 (1976).202See OFFICE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, PRESS RELEASE No.
220 (March 16, 1976). See also OFFICE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
PRESS RELEASE No. 229 (June 11, 1976).
[Vol. 52:535
IMPORT COMPETITION
limit expired, 203 to impose quotas on all other parties if he were to adopt the
ITC's recommendations. The terms of the Presidential relief were less
rigorous in one important respect than those of the ITC: the quotas were to
be in effect for only three years. The quota volume for stainless steel strip
was, however, lower for the first twelve months204 by about nine percent,
and although the Presidential quotas rise by three percent annually, they
do not reach the ITC's proposed 1976 level even in the third year. Equally
significant was the restructuring of the ITC's country allocations for all
products.2 05
The presidential revisions were justified as giving Japan, as a reward
for agreeing to the orderly marketing arrangement, a somewhat larger
quota than would have been otherwise allowed under the ITC's remedy.20 6
Relief as a Mirage
Confined more or less to an industry horizon in determining the degree
of injury and its causes, if not by the language of section 201 at least by
habitual analysis, the Commission has tended to recommend relief mea-
203The President is required to transmit to Congress his disposition of an affirmative
finding by the Commission within sixty days of receiving the report. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)
(Supp. V 1975). In Specialty Steel, the President consumed the full sixty days before
announcing that if orderly marketing arrangements could not be successfully negotiated, he
would impose quotas. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
PRESS RELEASE No. 200 (March 16, 1975). If Congress intends to override a presidential
rejection of an ITC recommendation, it must act within ninety days of receiving the
President's report. 19 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The Special Trade Representative
announced the combination of a marketing arrangement with Japan and imposed quotas for
other countries on June 11, 1976, three days short of the expiration of the Congressional
ninety day option for reinstating the ITC's recommendation.204That is, for June 1976 through June 1977-compared with ITC's calendar year.20
'The bases for restructuring are explained in OFFICE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, PRESS RELEASE No. 229, FACT SHEEr ON IMPORT RELIEF PROGRAM FOR
SPECIALTY STEEL 2 (June 11, 1976) [hereinafter cited as FACT SHEET]. For the quotas, see
Temporary Quantitative Limitation of the Importation into the United States of Certain
Articles of Stainless Steel or Alloy Tool Steel, Proclamation by the President, June 11, 1976,
41 Fed. Reg. 24101 (1976).
20 6The Special Trade Representative's extension of the period for calculating historical
shares to five years, 1971-1975, instead of the ITS's three years, 1972-1974, brought into
consideration the year 1975, when Japan's dominance in the market increased. See SPECIALTY
STEEL, supra note 52, at B6 (Table 5). The European Economic Community's share was
reduced; for example, the stainless sheet and strip import limits would have been 24.8 percent
of 79,000 tons, or 19,500 tons, as compared to the 15,800 tons the Special Trade
Representative allowed for 1976-1977. This was calculated by applying the 1972-1974 market
share for each product to the global quota. See id. at 5, B7 (Table 6). The Presidential
allocation for the European Economic Community as a whole was based on a sum of average
imports from each country. According to the Special Trade Representative, to present the
EEC with a "basket" would enable it more equitably to divide the total among its members
than the ITC plan, which would have made each individual country's quota equal to 1972-
1974 averages. See FACT SHEET, supra note 205. The ITC plan would have allowed the
French, for instance, to export to the United States 14,773 tons of sheet and strip in 1976, more
than it had ever shipped, although French tonnage had fallen twenty-five percent below its
1971 peak by 1974. The ITC proposed total quota for 1976 for stainless sheet and strip, the
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sures without examining their consequences. Until recently, the recom-
mendations have been devoid of supporting economic analysis to demon-
strate either the degree of protection they may afford compared with
alternatives, or the costs that may be imposed upon consumers. Lengthy
Information sections compile (or ignore) raw data that could be useful for
economic studies, and with rare exceptions the material can not be related
to the arbitrary pronouncements that all to often characterize the views of
the commissioners.
The President, on the other hand, being specifically authorized to take
into account not only the effects of relief proposals on international trade
in other products, but the welfare costs of higher prices, has been reluctant
to erect barriers to imports. Wherever possible he has substituted
adjustment assistance for-positive barriers. The Act has, of course,
provided the means whereby Congress, if sufficiently aggrieved by a
Presidential refusal to approve an ITC recommendation, can require its
adoption. While not exercised as yet, the option has served to oblige the
President, where political pressures have been strong, either to employ
quotas, or to arrive at "voluntary restraints" - i.e. orderly marketing
arrangements. Hence, the Act is well insulated from attempts to amend it or to
replace it by statutory quotas, along the lines of the Burke-Hartke bill.
20 7
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
It is possible to regard tariff protection as a policy area which does not
lend itself to the democratic process. By conveying great powers to the
President the Trade Act of 1974 took a risk. To date, the gamble has been
justified, as far as import relief is concerned. While seeming to make it easier
for domestic producers to check the flow of imports, the Trade Act of 1974
may disperse the protectionist thrust and to some extent dissipate its force.
When it was being considered in Congress, the Trade Act of 1974
was criticized for its complexity and for the extraordinary amount of discre-
tion it conveyed, in some instances, to the President. There were fears that
earlier versions of the legislation might make it easier to protect domestic
oligopolies and monopolies against vigorous foreign competition.
20 8
most important product, was 79,000 tons. This amount was in excess of sheet and strip
imports in any year since 1971 and exceeded 1975 imports of sheet and strip by 17 percent. It is
impossible to determine how the ITC total quota was determined. Based on its average share of
the sheet and strip market for 1972-1974, which was 18.7 percent, the French quota for 1976
would have been 14,773 tons.
As far as the total for all specialty steel imports is concerned, the Presidential global limit
of 147,000 tons is above the ITC's by 1,000 tons in the first year, and then increases by three
percent annually to 151,500 tons for the years 1977-1978, and 155,900 tons for 1978-1979. These
totals may be compared with the 151,200 tons actually imported in 1974, and 153,700 tons in
1975. The shortfall from the actual 1975 import level will be concentrated in plate, bar and
alloy tool steel. The sheet and strip 1976-1977 quota is in excess of actual 1975 imports by
almost ten percent. "Improving market conditions" accounted for this allowance. Id. at 5.207See note 9 supra.
208See Hearings on the Trade Reform Act of 1973, H.R. 19710, Before the Senate Finance
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That the escape clause has been weakened by the omission of the
requirement that increased imports be traceable to a trade concession is
indisputable. Moreover, measures of injury appear still to be in a relatively
early and superficial stage of analytical development and empirical
analysis, while the Commission's somewhat cavalier determinations, of
industries weights the scales against imports. In isolating imports as a
causal variable, the Commission deserves credit for moving ahead to use
more quantitative techniques than were applied under the Trade Act of
1962. Nevertheless, the ITC still has far to go, not only in providing an
adequate foundation for its conclusions, but in achieving consistency in its
reports. The problem of causality badly needs reexamination, perhaps in
an independent study unconnected with any current investigation, particu-
larly to arrive at a modus operandi for handling the effect of the business
cycle and the effects of shifts in consumer demand.
Unlike the ITC, the President has frequently taken account of the effect
of proposed relief measures on consumers, or the economy. Since the
Trade Act of 1974 does not forbid the Commission to consider the broader
effects of proposals for relief, its investigation should be extended to
include these matters, if only to aid the President in making his decisions.
At the same time it would be desirable if the Special Trade Representative
made public more detailed analyses of the President's reasons for differing
with the Trade Commission, or modifying its recommendations, than have
hitherto been available. In a society that relies on precedent for the
functioning of its administrative and judicial institutions, the suppression
of thorough explanation for an executive decision saps the spirit of due
process. The welfare consequences of the specialty steel, footwear, TV
receiver and sugar relief should have been discussed at length. A
proliferation of "voluntary" restraints adopted under the escape clause
reinforces coalesced oligopoly power in our economy.
Comm., 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. I113-1121 (1974) (testimony of W. Adams & J. Dirlam); id. at
1104-1110 (testimony of S. Graubard & A. McCauley).
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